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ABSTRACT
An important aspect of summary judgment law is now in great 
disorder. The intermediate federal courts of appeals are split both 
internally and among themselves on the circumstances, if any, under 
which denials of summary judgment should be appealable after trial 
and final judgment, and a Supreme Court opinion that addressed the 
issues only in dicta made matters worse. The Court’s approach was 
off-the-cuff, its thought process superficial and in some respects 
flatly in error, and its dicta seriously misguided, with the result that 
the intermediate federal courts of appeals were left in a quandary 
over whether to follow the dicta. An additional layer of splits among 
the circuits resulted. This Article describes the circuit splits, analyzes 
the Court’s opinion in Ortiz v. Jordan, examines how the courts of 
appeals have handled the issues since Ortiz and, most importantly, 
addresses the issues so unsatisfactorily treated in Ortiz.
The introduction to the Article explains the importance of the 
Article to anyone concerned with the workings of our court systems, 
because it raises significant issues about the appealability of harmful 
error, the circumstances under which interlocutory rulings are and 
are not “merged” in a judgment, and the relationship between 
interlocutory and post-judgment appeals. It raises important 
questions about the circumstances under which lower federal courts 
should, and should not, honor Supreme Court dicta. The 
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Introduction also enumerates the multiple insights and contributions 
that the Article makes.
In its analysis section, the Article argues why interlocutory 
appeals of summary judgment denials should not be made more 
freely available, to reduce the occasions for post-judgment review. It 
argues that when pre-judgment appeals of denials of summary 
judgment are available, those appeals both are and should be 
permissive, rather than mandatory. Most significantly, it argues that 
regardless of whether interlocutory appeals of summary judgment 
are available, post-trial, post-judgment appeals of the denials should 
be allowed when the denials were based on conclusions of law, 
rather than on the existence of genuine issues of material fact. In so 
arguing, I disagree with the position taken in dicta by the Supreme 
Court in Ortiz.
The analysis section is multi-faceted. It debunks the allegedly 
problematic nature of relying on a law/fact distinction to distinguish 
differently based summary judgment denials; undermines the view 
that adequate alternative remedies exist, with particular focus on 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50; rejects the argument that post-
judgment appeals of law-based summary judgment denials will come 
as an unfair surprise to the successful litigant in the trial court; 
considers whether the system should require litigants to offer trial 
judges an opportunity to reconsider their summary judgment denials 
and how that might best be done; shows the error of the views that 
the interlocutory nature of summary judgment denials constitutes a 
reason to deny post-judgment appeal and that it is necessary to 
preclude post-judgment appeals of law-based summary judgment 
denials to avoid greater injustice; and establishes that the fear of 
wasted trials is not an adequate reason to reject such appeals. The 
Article also calls for rejection of Supreme Court dicta that is not 
well-reasoned. The Article recommends what it takes to be the 
appropriate approach and concludes.
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INTRODUCTION
It is common knowledge that summary judgment practice is a 
significant feature of civil litigation. An important aspect of 
summary judgment law is now in great disorder. The intermediate 
federal courts of appeals are split both internally and among 
themselves on the circumstances, if any, under which denials of 
summary judgment should be appealable after trial and final 
judgment. And a Supreme Court decision—rendered in a case, Ortiz 
v. Jordan,1 in which the Court granted certiorari in order to resolve 
the circuit split—only made matters worse. The Court discovered
that the case did not actually pose the issue that the Court thought it 
posed—whether a party may appeal an order denying summary 
judgment after a district court has conducted a full trial on the merits 
and entered final judgment when the summary judgment motion 
presented a question of law and the trial court’s resolution of that 
question was the basis of its denial of summary judgment2—but the 
Court went ahead and opined, in dicta, on how that issue should be 
resolved.3 Unfortunately, the Court’s approach was off-the-cuff, its 
thought process superficial and in some respects flatly in error, and 
its dicta seriously misguided, with the result that the intermediate 
federal courts of appeals were left in a quandary over whether to 
follow the dicta. An additional layer of splits among the circuits 
resulted. Few legal scholars have made a foray into this morass. In 
this Article, I make that foray and illuminate what I believe is the 
correct answer to the question.
The fact that the Court granted certiorari in Ortiz speaks to the 
importance of the issues addressed in this Article. The failure of 
Ortiz to resolve the issue and end the circuit split suggests that the 
Court may revisit it. Indeed, the Court may want to stop in its tracks 
the additional circuit split that the circuits’ varying interpretations of 
1. 131 S. Ct. 884 (2011).
2. See id. at 892.
3. See id. at 892-93.
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Ortiz have created. But this Article is important not only to appellate 
practitioners, the parties they represent, and the courts that have to 
decide whether to permit appeals from summary judgment denials. It 
is important to anyone concerned with the workings of our court 
systems because it raises important issues about the appealability of 
harmful error, the circumstances under which interlocutory rulings 
are and are not “merged” in a judgment, and the relationship between 
interlocutory and post-judgment appeals. This Article also raises 
important questions about the circumstances under which lower 
federal courts should, and should not, honor Supreme Court dicta. 
The insights and contributions made by this Article include: 
(1) the light it sheds on the actual state of the law, molded by 
the federal appellate courts, governing the circumstances under 
which denials of summary judgment are appealable after final 
judgment. It similarly sheds light on how the Court’s decision in 
Ortiz has influenced and confused federal appellate court decisions 
made since Ortiz was handed down; 
(2) its identification of errors in the reasoning of the Supreme 
Court in Ortiz. The Article brings to bear knowledge concerning the 
circumstances under which denials of summary judgment are 
immediately appealable and when they are not so appealable to 
demonstrate the error of the Court’s conclusion that the time to seek 
review of a denial of summary judgment expires long before entry of 
final judgment. The Article shows why that conclusion was wrong if 
the summary judgment denial was not immediately appealable and 
wrong even if the denial was immediately appealable. In so doing, 
the Article educates its readers about the policies that underlie the 
final judgment rule and the policies that undergird the exceptions to 
that rule, and explains that even when appeals of summary judgment 
are allowed prior to judgment, those interlocutory appeals are not 
and should not be mandatory; 
(3) its arguments against making interlocutory appeals of 
summary judgment denials more freely available; and 
(4) its evaluation of the arguments for rejecting post-trial, post-
judgment appeals of summary judgment denials. The Article 
explains why it is not problematic for courts to distinguish summary 
judgment denials based on determinations of law from denials based 
on the existence of genuine issues of material fact. It informs the 
reader why the fact that summary judgment denials are interlocutory 
is no reason to deny post-judgment appeals and why justice will be 
served, not thwarted, by permitting post-judgment appeals of 
summary judgment denials that were based upon rulings of law. It 
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establishes that fear of wasted trials is not a good reason to deny 
post-judgment appeals of summary judgment denials that were based 
upon rulings of law. It demonstrates that litigants lack adequate 
alternative remedies, contrary to the views of courts that have 
thought that either interlocutory appeals or appeals from denials of 
post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law, based on 
insufficiency of the evidence, are satisfactory alternatives to post-
judgment appeals from summary judgment denials. It also makes 
clear why the winners in the trial court have no good argument for 
unfair surprise when summary judgment denials are appealed post-
judgment. And it shows how the denial of post-judgment appeals of 
summary judgment denials that were grounded in rulings of law is 
aberrant in light of the post-judgment appealability of denials of 
other motions.
The Article also is noteworthy for its invitation to courts to 
think through whether they should require parties who lost on 
summary judgment based on a legal ruling to preserve the error in 
ways that courts have not routinely required, for its suggestions of 
behaviors that courts might require of parties to preserve the error,
and finally, for its call for rejection of Supreme Court dicta that is 
not well-reasoned.
I am not a fan of motions for summary judgment. While in 
theory it makes sense to have a mechanism for resolving cases 
without trial when there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
the cases can be decided as a matter of law. But in practice, motions 
for summary judgment have become a tool for increasing the work 
demanded by litigation and the expense of litigation, often for no 
good reason and to the detriment particularly of plaintiffs, who 
disproportionately are the targets of such motions.4 Nonetheless, I 
4. A number of published articles report on empirical research about 
summary judgment motions, but they often do not provide data on the numbers or 
percentages of summary judgment motions that are denied, or on the numbers or 
percentages of motions against, rather than by, plaintiffs—much less on the numbers 
or percentages of motions denied by virtue of findings of genuine issues of material 
facts as opposed to holdings of law. Two available studies are JOE CECIL & GEORGE 
CORT, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., INITIAL REPORT ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRACTICE 
ACROSS DISTRICTS WITH VARIATIONS IN LOCAL RULES (2007), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/insumjre.pdf/$file/insumjre.pdf, and 
THEODORE EISENBERG & CHARLOTTE LANVERS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT RATES OVER 
TIME, ACROSS CASE CATEGORIES, AND ACROSS DISTRICTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
THREE LARGE FEDERAL DISTRICTS (2008), available at http://scholarship.
law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1107&context=lsrp_papers.  
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write here in support of the post-trial, post-judgment appealability of 
denials of summary judgment, in limited circumstances. So long as 
we have summary judgment, we should allow appeals of denials, as 
well as grants, of such judgments, just as we allow appeals of other 
orders that may constitute harmful error. Such review will not delay 
trial or increase the cost of trial. And although it may slightly 
increase the costs of appeal, that disadvantage will be outweighed by 
the value of error correction on issues of law. 
In this Article, I briefly describe the pre-Ortiz circuit splits, 
analyze Ortiz, examine how the courts of appeals have handled the 
issue since Ortiz, and address the several issues with which the 
Supreme Court did not grapple in Ortiz, although the Court spoke to 
some of them in cursory fashion. The Article recommends what it 
takes to be the appropriate approach and concludes.
I. BACKGROUND AND THE PRE-ORTIZ CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. The Limited Immediate Appealability of Summary Judgment 
Denials
As a preliminary matter, it is helpful to distinguish 
reviewability from appealability. 
“‘[R]eviewability’ . . . refers to whether a trial judge’s [or other decision 
maker’s] action can be scrutinized by an appellate court at any time. . . . 
[A]ppealability assumes that the trial judge’s action is reviewable[;] . . . 
The Federal Judicial Center study, which was based on data from fiscal 
2006, found that one or more summary judgment motions is filed in 17% of cases, 
that the motions are granted in whole or in part in 62–65% of the cases in which 
they are filed, and that defendants file summary judgment motions about three times 
as frequently as plaintiffs do. CECIL & CORT, supra, at 2-4, 7.   
A great compendium of criticisms of summary judgment as it is 
implemented in the federal courts is Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Essay: From the “No 
Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary Judgment” Days of Employment 
Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment Affirmed Without 
Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
685 (2013). For additional cogent criticisms of summary judgment, see, for 
example, John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 
551 (2007) (arguing that summary judgment discourages settlement, costs more than 
it saves, and creates a pro-defendant bias); D. Brock Hornby, Summary Judgment 
Without Illusions, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 273, 274-75 (2010) (arguing that summary 
judgment motion practice is neither simple, abbreviated nor inexpensive but instead 
is complex, protracted and expensive, tedious and very time-consuming for parties 
and judges, and thus is an impediment to the Federal Rules’ goals of just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determinations). 
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the question is whether it can be reviewed immediately or whether review 
must await final resolution of the entire case in the trial court.”5
Ordinarily, when a court denies a motion for summary 
judgment, the denial is not immediately appealable, even if the
movant sought to have the court dispose of the entire case.6 Whether 
the motion was for partial summary judgment or for judgment 
determining the entire case, a denial of summary judgment ordinarily 
does not constitute a final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.7 It merely results in the case proceeding. Hence, the denial is 
not immediately appealable unless it satisfies a common law or 
statutory exception to the final judgment rule. 
On occasion, a denial of summary judgment may be appealable 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) as effectively denying an injunction.8 And 
5. DANIEL J. MEADOR, THOMAS E. BAKER & JOAN E. STEINMAN,
APPELLATE COURTS: STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES, AND PERSONNEL 48 (2d 
ed. 2006).
6. Ortiz, 131 S. Ct. at 891.
7. Id.; accord Hearring v. Sliwowski, 712 F.3d 275, 279 (6th Cir. 2013); 
15B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3914.28 (2d ed. 1992). The rule that “a party must 
ordinarily raise all claims of error in a single appeal following final judgment on the 
merits, serves a number of important purposes.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981). “It emphasizes the deference that appellate courts 
owe to the trial judge as the individual initially called upon to decide the many 
questions of law and fact that occur in the course of a trial.” Id. “Permitting 
piecemeal appeals would undermine the independence of the district judge, as well 
as the special role that that individual plays in our judicial system.” Id. In addition, 
the rule is in accordance with the sensible policy of “[avoiding] the obstruction to 
just claims that would come from permitting the harassment and cost of a succession 
of separate appeals from the various rulings to which a litigation may give rise, from 
its initiation to entry of judgment.” Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 
(1940). “The rule also serves the important purpose of promoting efficient judicial 
administration.” Firestone, 449 U.S. at 374 (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 
417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974)).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) provides in pertinent part:
[T]he courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United 
States, . . . or of the judges thereof, granting, continuing, 
modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to 
dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may 
be had in the Supreme Court.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (2012); see also Or. Natural Res. Council, Inc. v. Kantor, 99 
F.3d 334, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996) (reviewing grant and denial of summary judgment 
where order effectively denied injunctive relief, threatened serious consequences, 
and could not be effectively challenged other than by immediate appeal).
By contrast, a denial of summary judgment itself is not an interlocutory 
order refusing an injunction within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) where it 
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on occasion a court may authorize an appeal of a denial of summary 
judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).9 Summary judgment denials 
also can be reviewed pursuant to the doctrine of pendent appellate 
jurisdiction in connection with 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) or (b) appeals, or 
in conjunction with pre-judgment appeals available under the 
collateral order doctrine.10 But summary judgment denials ordinarily 
will not be appealable pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(b)11 because they do not constitute final judgments.12 Mandamus 
decides only that the case should go to trial because of genuine issues of material 
fact and does not result in irreparable harm if not immediately reviewed. Switz. 
Cheese Ass’n v. E. Horne’s Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 23-25 (1966) (Where plaintiff 
moved for summary judgment granting a permanent injunction and awarding 
damages, the district court denied the motion because of genuine issues of material 
fact, and the intermediate court of appeals dismissed the appeal for want of 
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision that the order was not an 
interlocutory order refusing an injunction within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(a), reasoning that “denial of a motion for a summary judgment because of 
unresolved issues of fact does not settle . . . anything about the merits of the claim. 
It . . . decides only . . . that the case should go to trial. Orders that in no way touch 
on the merits . . . are not . . . ‘interlocutory’ within the meaning of § 1292(a) (1).”). 
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) provides: 
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise 
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order 
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial 
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the 
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he 
shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would 
have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its 
discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is 
made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however,
That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the 
district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge 
thereof shall so order. 
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2012). See, e.g., Rural Water Dist. No. 4 v. City of Eudora, 
720 F.3d 1269, 1278-79 (10th Cir. 2013) (reviewing denial of summary judgment 
certified by district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 
1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (same); McGow v. McCurry, 412 F.3d 1207, 1213 (11th Cir. 
2005) (same).
10. See, e.g., Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 153 (2d Cir. 2007) (exercising 
pendent jurisdiction over the denial of summary judgment on an unlawful search 
claim because the denial was inextricably intertwined with the question of 
defendants’ entitlement to qualified immunity); NationsBank Corp. v. Herman, 174 
F.3d 424, 427 (4th Cir. 1999) (exercising appellate jurisdiction over a summary 
judgment denial that was “‘intimately bound up with’” the grant of a preliminary 
injunction (quoting Fran Welch Real Estate Sales, Inc. v. Seabrook Island Co., 809 
F.2d 1030, 1032 (4th Cir. 1987))). As to collateral order appeals, see infra text 
accompanying notes 25-26.
11. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides in pertinent part: 
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directing a district court judge to grant a motion for summary 
judgment rarely would be appropriate. To obtain mandamus, “‘[t]he 
party seeking the writ’” typically has to show: (1) that it “‘has no 
other adequate means, such as a direct appeal, to obtain the relief [it] 
desires’”; (2) that “‘petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a 
way [that is] not correctable on appeal’”; (3) that the challenged 
“‘order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law’”; (4) embodies “‘an 
oft-repeated error, or manifests a persistent disregard of the 
[procedural] rules’”; or (5) that the “‘order raises new and important 
problems, or issues of law of first impression.’”13 There must be a 
usurpation of judicial power or a clear abuse of discretion.14 These 
(b) Judgment on Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties. When an 
action presents more than one claim for relief—whether as a claim, 
counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim—or when multiple parties 
are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or 
more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly 
determines that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or 
other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the 
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end 
the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time 
before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the 
parties’ rights and liabilities.
FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). While a denial of summary judgment could not itself give rise 
to a Rule 54(b) certification, if a district court certified a final judgment under Rule 
54(b) and a party had moved for summary judgment on a claim embraced by the 
certification, the denial of summary judgment could be viewed as merged in that 
judgment, and hence appealable with it. See, e.g., Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 
282, 288-89 (6th Cir. 1994) (hearing a Rule 54(b) appeal and considering the 
correctness of a denial of summary judgment that was raised on cross-appeal from a 
grant of summary judgment).
12. See supra text accompanying note 7; see also Marshall v. Grand Trunk 
W. R.R., 850 F. Supp. 2d 686, 709 (W.D. Mich. 2011) (noting that a plaintiff’s 
motion for summary judgment on liability, granted in part and denied in part, was 
not a final and immediately appealable order).
13. Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court, 495 F.3d 1062, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(quoting Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1977)); see 
also In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 2006). See 
generally 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 3934-3934.1 (3d ed. 2012) (concerning the 
courts of appeals’ practice as to supervisory and advisory mandamus).
14. See, e.g., Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95, 104 (1967) (quoting 
Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943)) (quoting De Beers 
Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945)) (citing Bankers Life 
& Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953)) (“The peremptory writ of 
mandamus has traditionally been used in the federal courts only ‘to confine an 
inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to 
exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.’ . . . While the courts have never 
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requirements seldom would be met where a summary judgment 
motion has been denied because the injured party remains able to 
win at trial and typically suffers no collateral irreparable harm. 
Additionally, to the extent that denials of summary judgment are in 
the district court’s discretion15—and that discretion is such that 
courts of appeals seldom find abuse16—mandamus to require a 
confined themselves to an arbitrary and technical definition of ‘jurisdiction,’ . . . 
only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial ‘usurpation of power’ will 
justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy. . . . Its office is . . . to confine the 
lower court to the sphere of its discretionary power.”), quoted with approval in
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 289 (1988); Allied 
Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980). The statutory basis for 
mandamus jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1651, which simply states, “The Supreme 
Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or 
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and 
principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012).
15. There is some uncertainty as to whether and to what extent federal 
district courts have discretion to deny summary judgment. Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(a) states, “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant 
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that] the movant 
is entitled to judgment of a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (emphasis added). 
Thus, read literally, the Rule appears not to provide discretion to deny summary 
judgment when the Rule’s requirements are met. However, historically courts have 
had some such discretion. Compare Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
255 (1986) (observing that courts may deny summary judgment when they have 
reason to believe that the better course would be to proceed to trial), and Kennedy v. 
Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249, 256-57 (1948) (vacating lower court’s entry of 
summary judgment and remanding for amplification of the record despite 
acknowledgment that the district court may have been justified in granting summary 
judgment, noting that a summary judgment record—because it is not as thorough as 
the trial record could be—may present a treacherous basis for deciding issues of 
“far-flung” importance), with Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) 
(holding that “the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary 
judgment” when its requirements are met). See generally 10A CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2728 (1998) (speaking in support of the notion that, in most 
situations in which the moving party seems to have carried its burden under Rule 56, 
the court has discretion to deny the motion, for various reasons). The amendments to 
Rule 56 generally are viewed as not having altered the courts’ discretion. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note on 2007 amendments (“These changes are 
intended to be stylistic only.”). 
16. See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 920, 
930 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that “‘when a district court denies summary 
judgment,’” an appellate court “‘review[s] that decision with considerable deference 
to the [district] court’ and ‘will not disturb the [district] court’s denial . . . unless [the 
appellate court] find[s] that the [district] court has indeed abused its discretion’” and 
affirming grant of summary judgment and denial of cross-motion for summary 
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district court to enter summary judgment will be rare. Moreover, 
mandamus is supposed to be available only as to orders that could 
not be effectively appealed after final judgment.17 Although courts 
often rejected post-judgment appeals of summary judgment denials, 
they did so not because post-judgment reversal would be ineffective 
to vindicate the substantive rights of the complaining party, but for 
other reasons, which we will explore below.18 Since post-judgment 
review ordinarily can adequately vindicate the appellant’s rights, 
mandamus will not be appropriate. In many cases, no later 
interlocutory rulings will provide a pre-judgment opportunity to 
appeal the denial of summary judgment.19 Thus, in most cases, the 
judgment (quoting SunTiger, Inc. v. Scientific Research Funding Grp., 189 F.3d 
1327, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). 
17. See, e.g., In re City of Springfield, 818 F.2d 565, 568-69 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(finding that the city’s ability to obtain relief by eventual appeal doomed its request 
for mandamus); In re Lane, 801 F.2d 1040, 1042 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that 
mandamus is limited to prevent litigants from obtaining review of orders that 
otherwise could not be appealed until after final judgment).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 152-80, 220, 232, and 240-64.
19. In many cases, no later interlocutory ruling will be immediately 
appealable under statutory or common law exceptions to the final judgment rule. 
Even if some later interlocutory ruling were immediately appealable under such an 
exception, the denial of summary judgment would become appealable only if it 
happened to fall within the narrow limits of the pendent appellate jurisdiction 
doctrine. That doctrine permits a court of appeals to decide an issue—including the 
propriety of a denial of summary judgment that is not itself immediately 
appealable—when it is inextricably intertwined with the court’s decision of an issue 
that is properly presented on an interlocutory appeal and when review of the former 
decision is necessary to ensure meaningful review of the latter, but—thus far—only 
in those circumstances. See Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 50-51
(1995); Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 177 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 673-75 (2009) (holding that the sufficiency of a complaint was 
inextricably intertwined with and directly implicated by defendants’ qualified 
immunity defense and that whether a motion to dismiss for insufficient pleading
should be granted or denied poses more of an abstract legal question than a fact-
based legal question and resolving it requires an appellate court to consider only the 
allegations—not a vast pretrial record—which is within an appellate court’s core 
competence); Skehan v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 465 F.3d 96, 104-05 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(upholding pendent party appellate jurisdiction and reversing denial of 
municipality’s summary judgment motion where the appellate court overturned 
rejection of individual defendants’ claim to qualified immunity and that ruling 
necessarily foreclosed a finding of municipal liability). But see Pedraza v. Shell Oil 
Co., 942 F.2d 48, 54-55 (1st Cir. 1991) (declining to exercise pendent appellate 
jurisdiction over cross-appeal by defendant of the denial of its motion for summary 
judgment after final judgment via dismissal on preemption grounds). See generally
Joan Steinman, The Scope of Appellate Jurisdiction: Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction 
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first opportunity to appeal a denial of summary judgment will arise 
after final judgment. 
Federal courts of appeals often have permitted appeals of 
summary judgment denials when those denials were raised in cross-
appeals after final judgment.20 These situations may constitute 
instances of pendent appellate jurisdiction.21 Typically, appeals 
courts permit appeals of summary judgment denials when the court 
is reviewing the grant of an opposing motion for summary judgment 
on the same claim.22 This is appropriate when the cross-motions are 
mirror-images of one another so that the parties agree on the material 
facts that are not genuinely in dispute and disagree only about which 
of the parties is entitled to judgment under the law. If the cross-
motions were not mirror-images but rather were based on different 
views of which facts are material, differences of opinion as to 
whether those facts are genuinely in dispute, and different 
propositions of law, there would be no reason that the mere fortuity 
of a cross-motion should justify an appeals court in reviewing a 
denial of summary judgment that it otherwise would not review.23
Before and After Swint, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1337 (1998); Stephen I. Vladeck, Pendent 
Appellate Bootstrapping, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 199 (2013).
20. See, e.g., Fidelity Co-Operative Bank v. Nova Casualty Co., 726 F.3d 
31 (1st Cir. 2013) (stating that, where cross-motions for summary judgment were 
made, the court of appeals must decide whether either party deserved judgment as a 
matter of law); Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1584 
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (assuming jurisdiction over plaintiff’s cross-appeal as a matter of 
pendent appellate jurisdiction and citing the extent to which review of the appealable 
orders would involve consideration of factors relevant to the otherwise non-
appealable order).
21. See supra note 19.
22. See, e.g., Price Trucking Corp. v. Norampac Indus., Inc., 748 F.3d 75 
(2d Cir. 2014) (reversing the grant of partial summary judgment to the plaintiff and 
ordering the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, which had cross-
moved for summary judgment); EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 
F.3d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 2013) (recognizing appellate jurisdiction to review the 
denial of a motion for summary judgment when it is presented in tandem with a 
grant of summary judgment); Watson Carpet & Floor Covering, Inc. v. Mohawk 
Indus., Inc., 648 F.3d 452, 459 (6th Cir. 2011) (same); Stilwell v. Am. Gen. Life Ins. 
Co., 555 F.3d 572, 576 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that, upon grant of a motion for 
summary judgment, denial of a cross-motion may be appealed because it is merged 
in the final judgment). 
23. See George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829, 839-40 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff’s cross-appeal of the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant deputies where her cross-
appeal involved different facts and legal standards than those germane to the 
deputies’ interlocutory appeal from the denial of summary judgment to them, based 
on qualified immunity, on a different one of plaintiff’s claims); Rearden LLC v. 
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Appeals courts nonetheless often state unqualifiedly that they have 
jurisdiction to review the denial of a summary judgment motion 
where a cross-motion for summary judgment has been granted.24
That generalization could lead them into error. 
By contrast to the picture sketched above of summary 
judgment denials that are not immediately appealable, when a 
motion for summary judgment is based on a defendant’s absolute or 
qualified immunity from suit, denial of the motion may be 
appealable under the collateral order doctrine.25 The basic rules are 
that an immediate appeal from the denial is available when the 
appeal presents a “purely legal issue,” such as what the clearly 
established law was at the time of defendant’s challenged actions, 
but that an immediate interlocutory appeal is not available when the 
denial of summary judgment rested on the district judge’s conclusion 
that factual issues, genuinely in dispute, precluded summary 
judgment.26
Rearden Commerce, Inc., 683 F.3d 1190, 1202 (9th Cir. 2012) (invoking the 
proposition that an appeals court “‘may review both the grant of [a summary 
judgment] motion and the corresponding denial of the opponent’s motion’” (quoting 
Redevelopment Agency of Stockton v. BNSF Ry. Co., 643 F.3d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 
2011))) (emphasis added). 
24. See, e.g., HIP Heightened Independence & Progress, Inc. v. Port Auth. 
of N.Y. & N.J., 693 F.3d 345, 351 n.1 (3d Cir. 2012). 
25. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1996) (holding that an 
officer could immediately appeal the denial of his summary judgment motion to the 
extent that it turned on issues of law, despite his prior appeal of the denial of his 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and notwithstanding that other claims, 
as to which qualified immunity was not a defense, would require defendant to 
submit to discovery and to trial); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527, 529 (1985) 
(upholding appeal of a denial of summary judgment, sought on the basis of qualified 
immunity, reasoning in part that such a denial finally and conclusively disposes of 
the claim of a right not to stand trial, resolves an issue—the availability of an 
immunity from suit—that is “conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff’s 
claim,” and determines a matter that is too important to be denied effective review 
and that is not effectively reviewable after final judgment). 
26. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995) (holding that a denial of 
summary judgment predicated on the existence of a genuine issue of material fact is 
not immediately appealable); Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530 (holding that the denial of a 
claim to qualified immunity “is an appealable final decision within the meaning of 
28 U.S.C. § 1291,” to the degree that the qualified immunity claim turns on an issue 
of law); Campos v. Van Ness, 711 F.3d 243, 245 (1st Cir. 2013) (noting that court of 
appeals has “jurisdiction to entertain an interlocutory appeal from a denial of 
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds ‘only if the material facts are
taken as undisputed and the issue on appeal is one of law’” (quoting Mlodzinski v. 
Lewis, 648 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2011))). 
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Ordinarily, if a court denies a motion for summary judgment 
sought by a defendant based on absolute or qualified immunity from 
suit, that defendant will want to appeal the denial immediately, so as 
to avoid further burdens and financial and psychological costs of 
litigation in the district court. However, if the defendant fails to take 
the immediate appeal, or if that appeal is rejected on non-merits 
grounds such as untimeliness, the defendant will want to appeal the 
denial of summary judgment after final judgment against him. One 
of the central questions addressed by this Article is whether a 
defendant may at that point appeal the summary judgment denial.
Similarly, if a motion for summary judgment, sought by either 
party, is denied and that denial is immediately appealable by virtue 
of § 1292(a), a § 1292(b) certification, pendent appellate jurisdiction, 
or the grant of a petition for mandamus, the injured party ordinarily 
will take the immediate appeal. In these instances, the losing party on 
the motion typically will be the litigant who sought permission to 
appeal, if permission is necessary. Having sought and received that 
permission, or having sought (or argued for denial of) a preliminary 
injunction that the district court ruled upon in a decision with which 
the denial of summary judgment was closely bound-up,27 it would be 
For an order to fall within the collateral order doctrine, it must be 
conclusive on the matter it addresses, resolve questions that are too independent of 
the merits to need to be deferred, be too important to be denied review, and involve 
rights that will be lost if immediate review is not afforded. Digital Equip. Corp. v. 
Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan 
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949). To regard denials of summary judgment based 
on genuine issues of material fact as falling within the collateral order doctrine 
would entail abandoning that doctrine’s requirement that the subject of the order be 
separate from the merits. The overlap between the merits and the question whether 
there are genuine issues of material fact as to the merits is too great for allowance of 
an immediate appeal to make sense. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 316. The Court also has 
emphasized that trial courts have greater expertise than appellate courts in 
determining whether a genuine issue of material fact has been presented, and that it 
would take an appellate court substantial time to review a decision that genuine 
issues of material fact preclude summary judgment, in concluding that it would not 
be a wise use of appellate resources to permit interlocutory appeals of summary 
judgment denials that were based on the presence of genuine issues of material fact. 
Id. at 316-17.
27. By contrast, the Supreme Court has permitted the winning party on a 
claim to ask the district court to direct entry of a final judgment as to that claim and 
to expressly determine that there is no just reason for delay of an appeal under Rule 
54(b). See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 9-13 (1980) 
(involving Curtiss-Wright who was granted summary judgment on a claim and 
sought Rule 54(b) certification; in considering the propriety of the certification, the 
Court made no mention of the fact that it was the winner on the claim that had 
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unusual for the litigant not to immediately proceed with the appeal. 
However, if, for some reason, an available immediate appeal was not 
taken pursuant to 1292(a), (b), pendent appellate jurisdiction, or 
mandamus, questions arise whether, post-judgment, the losing 
litigant can appeal the denial of its summary judgment motion. This 
Article will address whether defendants who fail to take an available 
pre-judgment appeal of a summary judgment denial waive the right 
to appeal the denial after trial and final judgment. It also will address 
whether defendants who did not waive the right to appeal the denial 
after trial and final judgment, including those who had no 
opportunity to take a pre-judgment appeal, may do so after trial and 
final judgment. A circuit split exists especially as to the latter issue. 
Prior to Ortiz v. Jordan, all federal appeals courts held that, as 
a general rule, they would not entertain post-trial, post-judgment 
appeals of summary judgment denials.28 But many made a legal 
question exception, the scope of which is discussed in Section B 
below.
B. The Pre-Ortiz Circuit Splits
Prior to Ortiz, some federal courts of appeals took a hard line 
against post-judgment review of summary judgment denials. Some 
courts and commentators found the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh 
Circuits to be in this camp.29 The First and Federal Circuits were not 
as emphatic, but leaned toward the same unyielding position.30 Close 
obtained the certification). In that circumstance, it is possible that the party who lost 
on the claim in question might prefer to wait until later to take the appeal, but courts 
have held that the appeal must be taken within thirty days after a Rule 54(b) 
certification, or the appeal will be too late and therefore outside the appellate court’s 
jurisdiction. Taylor v. Cont’l Grp. Change in Control Severance Pay Plan, 933 F.2d 
1227, 1231 n.2 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)); Cox v. Am. Cast Iron 
Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1549 (11th Cir. 1986).
28. E.g., Cravens v. Smith, 610 F.3d 1019, 1025-27 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating 
that the Eighth Circuit would not review a district court’s denial of summary 
judgment, after trial on the merits, and that the proper redress was through appeal of 
the denials of subsequent motions for judgment as a matter of law; pursuant to those 
principles, refusing to review a summary judgment denial). The court limited its 
review to issues that plaintiff raised in its motion for a new trial. Id. at 1027.
29. Feld v. Feld, 688 F.3d 779, 781-83 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (lining up the 
circuits somewhat differently); see, e.g., Jesse Leigh Jenike-Godshalk, Comment, 
Appealed Denials and Denied Appeals: Finding a Middle Ground in the Appellate 
Review of Denials of Summary Judgment Following a Full Trial on the Merits, 78 
U. CIN .L. REV. 1595, 1608, 1610 (2010). 
30. See Feld, 688 F.3d at 782.
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examination of the case law from these circuits indicates that their 
stances were not so absolute, however. 
The seminal case in the Fourth Circuit is Chesapeake Paper 
Products Co. v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp.31 Although 
Chesapeake is not very notable on its facts,32 it is notable for its 
reasoning in rejecting appeals of summary judgment denials that are 
filed after full trial and entry of judgment. This Article examines and 
challenges that reasoning in a later section.33 For the present, note 
that while the Fourth Circuit often refused to entertain post-judgment 
appeals of summary judgment denials,34 even it addressed such 
appeals when the district court granted the winning party’s 
31. 51 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995).
32. In Chesapeake, the district court denied the motion by Stone & Webster 
(S & W) for partial summary judgment in a breach of contract action, where S & W 
asked the court to rule as a matter of law that the rights and liabilities of the parties 
were governed by an amended engineering contract rather than by an amended 
purchase order. Id. at 1230. The district judge denied the motion because of 
ambiguities in the documentation that presented “‘genuine issues of material fact’” 
regarding the contract’s formation, terms, and proper interpretation. Id. at 1233 
(quoting J.A. at 302). At trial, the jury considered both the same and additional 
evidence, and ruled for plaintiff. Id. Defendant appealed, arguing inter alia error in 
the denial of its motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1234. S & W sought to 
distinguish cases that had disallowed appeals from denials of summary judgment 
motions, on the ground that they involved motions seeking dismissal of entire cases, 
whereas S & W’s motion sought only partial summary judgment, via a 
determination of what documents governed the parties’ rights and obligations. Id. at 
1235. It argued that “summary judgment denials of . . . discrete legal issues are and 
should be reviewable after trial, especially because such issues cannot support a 
judgment as a matter of law dismissing the opponent’s entire claim.” Id. The Fourth 
Circuit rejected S & W’s characterization of this case as involving a summary 
judgment denial that raised a discrete legal issue rather than as involving a holding 
that the case presented genuine issues of material fact, but it addressed and rejected 
the principle for which S & W argued as well. Id.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 152-53, 155, 162-65, 172, 177, text 
following notes 174, 178, and notes 208, 211-12.
34. See, e.g., Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 380-81 & n.5 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(refusing to review denial of summary judgment after trial and judgment on a claim 
that defendant unlawfully interfered with plaintiff’s exercise of her FMLA rights, 
where plaintiff argued that she established as a matter of law that she suffered from 
an FMLA-qualifying condition); Benner v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 1228, 
1233 (4th Cir. 1996) (declining to review a pre-trial denial of summary judgment 
after trial and judgment as to an insurance policy, the household exclusion of which 
plaintiff argued was void as a matter of law); BellSouth Telesensor v. Info. Sys. & 
Networks Corp., No. 92-2355, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 24802, at *30-31 (4th Cir. 
Sept. 5, 1995) (refusing to review allegation that denial of summary judgment was 
erroneous after trial because there was no genuine issue of material fact when the 
decision on the motion was made).
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corresponding motion for summary judgment,35 and in non-
precedential decisions.36
The Fifth Circuit, the second reputed hard-liner, produced an 
even more mixed set of precedents. The most carefully reasoned 
Fifth Circuit decision, Black v. J.I. Case Co., rejected post-judgment 
appeals from summary judgment denials when judgment followed a 
trial on the merits.37 The Fifth Circuit was careful to say, however, 
that Black in no way undermined the Circuit’s decisions reviewing 
summary judgment denials “where the district court granted the 
opposing party’s summary judgment motion.”38 Moreover, in Becker 
v. Tidewater, Inc., the court held review of the district court’s legal 
conclusions in denying summary judgment to be appropriate where 
the case had been tried to the judge, in a bench trial.39 It noted that 
other circuits hold a denial of summary judgment to be appealable 
after trial on the merits when the district court’s ruling depends on 
the decision of an issue of law and that Rule 50 motions are not 
required following a bench trial.40 In its view, the fact that Becker
35. Benner, 93 F.3d at 1232-33 (reviewing the denial of plaintiff’s motion 
for summary judgment regarding an umbrella insurance policy, where the district 
court had granted Nationwide’s corresponding summary judgment motion, relying 
on Chesapeake’s limitation of its holding not to apply to such situations).
36. See, e.g., Hedgepeth v. Parker’s Landing Prop. Owners Ass’n, 388 F. 
App’x 242, 245 (4th Cir. 2010). The district court had denied Hedgepeth’s motion 
for summary judgment, concluding that there were no issues of material fact, but 
ruling against him on the law as to the easement he claimed. Id. On appeal, he raised 
the issue on which he had lost in the denial of his summary judgment motion. Id. 
The Fourth Circuit’s opinion indicates that, at oral argument, Hedgepeth waived a 
particular argument in support of the easement that he claimed and embraced 
another. Id. The court considered the latter only, in light of Hedgepeth’s waiver of 
the former, but it nowhere indicated that it would not consider the easement issue 
because the alleged error in deciding it had come in the denial of plaintiff’s motion 
for summary judgment. Id. at 245-46.
37. 22 F.3d 568, 570-71 (5th Cir. 1994) (re-affirming prior Fifth Circuit 
decisions).
38. Id. at 570 n.3 (citing Ranger Ins. Co. v. Estate of Mijne, 991 F.2d 240, 
241 (5th Cir. 1993)) (reversing denial of summary judgment in conjunction with 
review of a district court’s grant of summary judgment, noting that because the 
underlying facts were stipulated, only questions of law remained). More recent Fifth 
Circuit decisions have continued to allow post-judgment appeals from summary 
judgment denials that were paired with the grant of a cross-motion for summary 
judgment. E.g., Parkans Int’l LLC v. Zurich Ins. Co., 299 F.3d 514, 516 (5th Cir. 
2002). 
39. 586 F.3d 358, 365 n.4 (5th Cir. 2009).
40. Id. at 365-66 n.4. Indeed, they are not allowed. Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 50 applies only to jury trials. FED. R. CIV. P. 50. In bench trials, “the court 
must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately.” FED. R.
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involved a bench trial, rather than a trial to a jury, distinguished it 
from Black, and the precedents from other circuits that were contrary 
to Black gave the court reason to look for bases for distinguishing 
Black.41
In Davidson v. Veneman, after final judgment, a Fifth Circuit 
panel reviewed a denial of summary judgment seeking an award of 
interest, and affirmed.42 It did not discuss the propriety of reviewing 
that order. And in Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Brantley 
Trucking, Inc., the Fifth Circuit, while purporting to follow the rule 
against allowing post-judgment appeals from summary judgment 
denials, faced a situation in which the district court, in its final 
judgment, “denied Empire’s motion for summary judgment, finding 
as a matter of law that no exclusion in Empire’s [insurance] policy 
precluded primary coverage for the truck accident” that was the basis 
of the underlying suit.43 Because the summary judgment was “in” the 
final judgment, review of the latter entailed review of the former.44
Later, we will return to the question whether summary judgment 
denials aren’t always merged in the final judgment.45 For the 
moment, the point is that these cases illustrate that the Fifth Circuit’s 
position appears to have softened.
The Eleventh Circuit, the third reportedly hard-line circuit, did 
not take an unyielding position against post-trial, post-judgment 
appeals of earlier denials of summary judgment motions. The court 
reviewed denials of motions for summary judgment, after final 
judgment, when it reviewed grants of cross-motions for summary 
judgment.46 In addition, in Griffith v. General Motors Corp., the 
CIV. P. 52(a)(1). Although Rule 52(a)(3) provides that a district “court is not 
required to state findings or conclusions when ruling on a motion under Rule 12 or 
56,” FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(3), Rule 56(a) directs district courts to “state on the record 
the reasons for granting or denying the motion,” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). When a court 
concludes that genuine issues of material fact are present, it does not go on to make 
findings on those genuine issues; it leaves them to the jury. See FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a). If a court concludes that no genuine issues of material fact are present, it will 
make findings and decide the issues of law presented in the course of “stat[ing] on 
the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.” Id.
41. Becker, 586 F.3d at 365-66 n.4.
42. 317 F.3d 503, 505, 508, 510 (5th Cir. 2003).
43. 220 F.3d 679, 680 (5th Cir. 2000).
44. Id.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 241-46.
46. See, e.g., Chavez v. Mercantil Commercebank, N.A., 701 F.3d 896, 904 
(11th Cir. 2012) (reversing order granting summary judgment to the bank and 
denying summary judgment to Chavez); Equity Inv. Partners, LP v. Lenz, 594 F.3d 
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Eleventh Circuit entertained General Motors’ cross-appeal of the 
denial of its motion for summary judgment on a claim that the 
seatbelt system was defective in the Silverado model47 where it heard 
that appeal, not in conjunction with an appeal from the grant of a 
cross-motion for summary judgment, but in conjunction with 
plaintiff’s appeal from a jury verdict against her on the defective 
seatbelt claim.48 Thus, the court reviewed the denial of a summary 
judgment motion on appeal following a full trial and judgment.49
When the First Circuit took a hard stand against post-trial, post-
judgment appeals of summary judgment denials, it did so (at least in 
recent years) in contexts in which the appellate court found that fact 
1338, 1345 (11th Cir. 2010) (reversing the grant and affirming the denial of motions 
for summary judgment, both on the basis of genuine issues of material fact).
47. 303 F.3d 1276, 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002). 
48. Id. at 1278.
49. Earlier, in Holley v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Services, Inc., the 
court had made the point that “a party may not rely on the undeveloped state of the 
facts at the time he moves for summary judgment to undermine a fully-developed 
set of trial facts.” 835 F.2d 1375, 1378 (11th Cir. 1988). The court’s position was 
that 
the party whose motion for summary judgment was denied may not appeal 
[denial of] the motion if the party admits that: (a) by trial[,] the evidence 
produced by the opposing party was sufficient to be presented to the jury; 
or (b) by trial[,] the evidence had been supplemented or changed in some 
manner favorable to the party who opposed summary judgment.
Id. at 1377-78. In Holley, the moving party had conceded that, by trial, the evidence 
was sufficient to go to the jury. Id. at 1377. As one commentator has explained, 
[t]his reasoning would support a legal issue exception. If the denial of 
summary judgment was based on a legal issue, then a party could argue 
that the issue was for the judge to decide, and there was nothing to submit 
to the jury. A party could also potentially argue that any factual 
developments would not affect the determination of the legal issue. 
Jenike-Godshalk, supra note 29, at 1604-05 n.57. While sometimes rejecting the 
distinction, other circuits, like the commentator, acknowledged that Holley’s 
reasoning supports the distinction, for appeals purposes, between law-based and 
fact-based summary judgment denials. See Black v. J.I. Case Co., 22 F.3d 568, 571 
n.5 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that the reasoning in Holley supported that distinction); 
Chesapeake Paper Prods. Co. v. Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 51 F.3d 1229, 1235 
& n.8 (4th Cir. 1995) (same). But in Lind v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the court, 
announcing broad dicta, stated that a pretrial denial of a summary judgment motion 
was not reviewable on appeal following a full trial and judgment. 254 F.3d 1281, 
1286 (11th Cir. 2001). The court found that the Holley rule had been extended 
beyond the conditions Holley stated, and that the circuit had in effect adopted the 
rule against all post-trial review of summary judgment denials, even though the 
extension of Holley had come in cases where the sufficiency of the evidence was at 
issue. Id. at 1283-84. The Griffith case, discussed in the text, reflects a retreat from 
Lind’s position. Griffith, 303 F.3d at 1278, 1284.
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issues precluded summary judgment so that the “challenge [fell] 
under the general prohibition against reviewing summary judgment 
denials after a full trial and final judgment on the merits.”50 The 
denials would not have been appealable even if the First Circuit 
recognized an exception for appeals of denials that were predicated 
on legal determinations. In Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. 
Pesante, the court entertained a post-judgment appeal of a summary 
judgment denial where, after the denial, the parties filed a Joint 
Motion for Entry of Final Judgment in favor of Pesante, which 
judgment the district court then entered.51 The court noted that 
although it does 
“not have jurisdiction over denials of summary judgment motions . . . 
where a genuine issue of material fact remains in dispute[,]” . . . [h]ere . . . 
there were no longer any factual matters to be resolved at a trial . . . . It is 
from this final judgment, based on undisputed facts, that Commercial 
Union appeals, and we therefore have jurisdiction.52
On the merits, the court reversed the judgment and directed entry of 
judgment for Commercial Union.53 Such a position exemplifies 
accepting post-judgment appeals from summary judgment denials 
when they pose only issues of law—although here there had been no 
trial.
In the 1980s, the Federal Circuit said that a denial of summary 
judgment is not reviewable on appeal from the final judgment 
entered after trial, but—like the First Circuit—it took this position in 
cases in which summary judgment was denied based on the existence 
of triable issues of fact.54 But in 1999, 2009, and 2013, it concluded 
50. See, e.g., Ji v. Bose Corp., 626 F.3d 116, 128 n.11 (1st Cir. 2010); 
Rivera-Torres v. Ortiz Velez, 341 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 2003) (refusing a post-trial, 
post-judgment appeal of a summary judgment denial where the arguments rested on 
alleged inadmissibility of evidence and failure to offer sufficient evidence to go to 
trial, noting that the facts elicited at trial often are probative of defendants’ 
entitlement to qualified immunity).
51. 459 F.3d 34, 36 (1st Cir. 2006).
52. Id. at 36-37 (quoting Rivera-Jiménez v. Pierluisi, 362 F.3d 87, 93 (1st 
Cir. 2004)). The First Circuit also considered the appeal from a denial of summary 
judgment in conjunction with considering the appeal from a grant of summary 
judgment. See, e.g., P.R. Am. Ins. Co. v. Rivera-Vázquez, 603 F.3d 125, 132-34 (1st 
Cir. 2010) (vacating both orders because of errors and inconsistencies in the district 
court’s approach to the motions); see also Parella v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emps.’ Ret. 
Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1999) (reversing and granting summary judgment to
the loser below on appeals after cross-motions for summary judgment).
53. Commercial Union, 459 F.3d at 38-39.
54. See, e.g., Glaros v. H.H. Robertson Co., 797 F.2d 1564, 1567, 1573 
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (refusing to review, after trial and judgment, a denial of summary 
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differently, in holdings and in dicta, stating that a denial of a motion 
for summary judgment may be appealed, even after a final judgment 
at trial, if the motion involved a purely legal question and the factual 
disputes resolved at trial do not affect the resolution of that legal 
question.55 It may be that, after final judgment at trial, the Federal 
Circuit will review a summary judgment denial, but only if the 
regional circuit from which a case came would do so.56
The Eighth Circuit has been inconsistent. It sometimes has 
rejected the distinction between summary judgments denied by dint 
of genuine issues of material fact and those denied on legal grounds, 
in deciding whether the denials were appealable after trial on the 
merits.57 In other cases, it has held that when the denial was based on 
judgment that had been based on the trial court’s finding of genuine factual disputes 
as to plaintiff’s second claim); Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 669 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986) (declining, after trial and judgment, to review denial of summary 
judgment where the district court had recognized several issues of fact that had to be 
determined before defendant could be held liable for a tying arrangement in 
violation of the antitrust laws). 
55. Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., 563 F.3d 1358, 1366 
n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (dicta); United Techs. Corp. v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 
189 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (relying on the principle stated in the text in 
reviewing and reversing, on appeal after a bench trial and final judgment, the denial 
of United’s motion for summary judgment, which was sought on the basis of res 
judicata). The court did, however, first examine whether United preserved its res 
judicata defense for appeal. United Techs. Corp., 189 F.3d at 1344. It stated that “[a] 
party may preserve an issue for appeal by renewing the issue at trial or by including 
it in memoranda of law or proposed conclusions of law.” Id. “From the record 
below, [it found] that United renewed the res judicata issue during the [] bench trial 
and in its proposed conclusions of law submitted to the court after the trial,” so it 
reached the res judicata issue. Id. 
56. See Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 726 F.3d 1306, 1340 
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (looking to Seventh Circuit law in concluding that, after trial and 
judgment, a denial of summary judgment could be appealed if the motion involved a 
purely legal question and factual disputes that went to trial did not affect the 
resolution of that legal question). 
57. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Golden Triangle, 121 F.3d 351, 355 & n.7 (8th 
Cir. 1997) (finding the distinction problematic and without merit in light of the 
absence of a requirement that a district court delineate why it denied summary 
judgment and the potential difficulty an appellate court would face in making that 
determination, the argument that “‘all summary judgments are rulings of law,’” 
concern that such an approach might benefit only litigants who fail to utilize Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 50 and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and concern that such a 
distinction might deter the exercise of discretion to deny summary judgment 
(quoting Black v. J.I. Case Co., 22 F.3d 568, 571 n.5 (5th Cir 1994))). Since 
December 1, 2010, however, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 has required 
district courts to explain their summary judgment rulings. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The 
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a purely legal question, the decision was appealable after final 
judgment.58 Post-Ortiz, it held a denial of summary judgment not to 
be appealable after final judgment, regardless of the grounds of the 
denial, but in doing so it relied solely on the principle that the earliest 
circuit opinion should be followed when conflicting panel opinions 
have come to exist.59 The earliest opinion of the court had rejected 
post-trial appeals of summary judgment denials regardless of the 
grounds on which summary judgment had been denied.60
The Second Circuit has ruled against post-trial, post-judgment 
review of summary judgment denials, based in part on judicial 
economy. It has expressed fears that, if review routinely were 
available, district courts would be wary of denying summary 
judgment and of wasting their resources trying cases to judgments 
that later would be overturned on the basis of an erroneous denial of 
summary judgment. For this reason and others, in the leading case of 
Pahuta v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., the Second Circuit determined that 
it generally would not review denials of summary judgment.61 But 
Pahuta reached this decision where the motion had been denied 
because of genuine issues of material fact and where denial of a Rule 
50 motion confirmed that trial had been necessary.62 The court 
observed that review would not spare the parties the burden of trial; 
that it made no sense to reverse a judgment on a verdict where the 
trial evidence was sufficient even if, at the summary judgment stage, 
the available evidence had not been sufficient; and that greater 
injustice would be done by depriving a party of a jury verdict than by 
failing to reverse an erroneous summary judgment denial.63
other concerns expressed in Metropolitan Life are addressed later in this Article. See 
infra text accompanying notes 152-62, 177-219, 263-65.
58. White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. McGill Mfg. Co., 165 F.3d 1185, 1189-92 
(8th Cir. 1999) (addressing argument after trial and judgment that district court erred 
in denying motion for partial summary judgment where the denial was based on a 
purely legal question, here a question of contract interpretation), acknowledged in
Hertz v. Woodbury Cnty., 566 F.3d 775, 780 (8th Cir. 2009); cf. Bakker v. 
McKinnon, 152 F.3d 1007, 1010-12 (8th Cir. 1998) (purporting to follow the 
general rule after a bench trial against permitting post-trial, post-judgment review of 
a denial of summary judgment but addressing the very legal issues that plaintiff 
raised in her rejected summary judgment motion).
59. See Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2011).
60. Lopez v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 690 F.3d 869, 875 (8th Cir. 2012).
61. 170 F.3d 125, 129-30 (2d Cir. 1999).
62. Id. at 131.
63. Id. at 130-32. Cases following Pahuta include Rivenburgh v. CSX 
Transportation, 280 F. App’x 61, 63 (2d Cir. 2008); Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 
F.3d 192, 199 (2d Cir. 2004); Hermès International v. Lederer de Paris Fifth 
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However, Pahuta cited, approvingly, a case in which the Second 
Circuit had held that summary judgment denials can be appealed 
once final judgment has been entered if there was no intervening trial 
on the merits,64 and left open the possibility of making exceptions to 
the norm.65 In a later case, Schaefer v. State Insurance Fund,66 the 
Second Circuit declared that the rule that “‘where summary 
judgment is denied and the movant subsequently loses after a full 
trial on the merits, the denial of summary judgment may not be 
appealed,’ . . . does not apply where the district court’s error was 
purely one of law.”67
In the remaining circuits, the trend also has been toward 
allowing post-judgment appeals of summary judgment denials that 
rested on errors of law. The Third Circuit exemplifies this trend. In 
Pennbarr Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America (INA), it ordered 
the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff Remington and the district 
court’s award to Remington to be vacated, and reversed the order of 
the district court denying INA’s motion for summary judgment.68 It 
did so on the basis of its holding that, as a matter of law, Remington 
could not recover the losses it claimed under its business interruption 
insurance policy.69 The Third Circuit also has found jurisdiction to 
review summary judgment denials upon cross-appeals of summary 
judgment grants and denials.70
Avenue, Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2000); Weissman v. Dawn Joy Fashions, 
Inc., 214 F.3d 224, 229 n.2, 232 (2d Cir. 2000).
64. Pahuta, 170 F.3d at 131-32 (citing United States v. 228 Whites Hill 
Road, 916 F.2d 808, 811 (2d Cir. 1990)).
65. Id. at 132.
66. 207 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2000).
67. Id. at 142 (emphasis added) (quoting McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 
989, 995 (6th Cir. 1997)).
68. 976 F.2d 145, 155 (3d Cir. 1992).
69. Id. at 149, 151.
70. See, e.g., HIP Heightened Independence & Progress, Inc. v. Port Auth. 
of N.Y. & N.J, 693 F.3d 345, 351 & n.1 (3d Cir. 2012) (exercising appellate 
jurisdiction to review denial of a summary judgment motion where a cross-motion 
for summary judgment had been granted); Sacred Heart Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan, 958 
F.2d 537, 543 (3d Cir. 1992) (reviewing rulings on cross-motions for summary 
judgment and remanding for entry of summary judgment in favor of appellant); see 
also Pediatrix Screening, Inc. v. Telechem Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 541, 545-48 (3d Cir. 
2010) (permitting plaintiff to appeal the defendant’s recovery on a counterclaim on 
the ground that it was barred by a legal defense, where the legal argument was 
clearly set forth in plaintiff’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion, defendant “was not ambushed 
by Pediatrix’s post-trial argument . . . nor confronted by the re[-]animation of a 
lifeless corpse” and, the court concluded, “‘[i]t would be unfair to . . . penalize [a 
party] for failing to jump up and down or labor an objection’ that had already been 
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The Sixth Circuit has recognized an exception to the general 
rule against allowing a post-trial appeal of the denial of a summary 
judgment motion where the denial involved a question of law, rather 
than being based upon the presence of issues of material fact.71 The 
court reasoned that the interests underlying the general rule are not 
implicated when the denial is based on a question of law.72 It may not 
apply this exception, however, when a disputed factual question is 
inextricably tied to the legal issue.73
The Seventh Circuit has sent conflicting signals. It recognized 
an exception to the general rule disfavoring post-trial review of 
summary judgment denials in cases where the plaintiff–movant 
notified the district court of its intention to abandon claims at trial if 
summary judgment as to those claims were denied, for then the 
denial “had the effect of ending any consideration of the claim[s]” in 
question in the district court.74 The Seventh Circuit even suggested a 
general receptivity to post-trial review of summary judgment denials 
preserved for appeal” (quoting Bohler-Uddeholm Am., Inc. v. Ellwood Grp., 247 
F.3d 79, 109 (3d Cir. 2001))). See generally 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2818 (3d ed. 
2012) (“The settled rule in federal courts . . . is that a party may assert on appeal any 
question that has been properly raised in the trial court. Parties are not required to 
make a motion for a new trial challenging the supposed errors as a prerequisite to 
appeal.”). 
71. United States ex rel. A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 
400 F.3d 428, 441 (6th Cir. 2005) (reviewing denial of summary judgment that was 
based upon a determination that certain matters were immaterial, an issue that did 
not require the resolution of any disputed facts).
72. Paschal v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 295 F.3d 565, 571-72 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(permitting post-trial, post-judgment review of a denial of summary judgment based 
upon a legal issue—tolling of the statute of limitations—that did not require the 
resolution of any disputed facts); McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995 (6th Cir. 
1997) (after post-trial entry of judgment as a matter of law against defendant Sowle 
on an unreasonable search and seizure claim, reversing denial of summary judgment 
for Sowle on that claim, based upon qualified immunity, emphasizing that the error 
was purely one of law and that no injustice flows from such a reversal that is 
comparable to the injustice that would flow if a jury verdict were reversed after 
summary judgment were denied based on a perceived issue of fact); cf. Kennedy v. 
City of Cincinnati, 483 F. App’x 110, 111-12 (6th Cir. 2012) (denying appellate 
review of the order denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment after entry of 
judgment on a jury verdict on the ground that there existed genuine issues of 
material fact).
73. Barber v. Louisville & Jefferson Cnty. Metro. Sewer Dist., 295 F. 
App’x 786, 789-90 (6th Cir. 2008).
74. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 353 n.55 (7th Cir. 
1988).
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that were based on legal rulings.75 The court subsequently took the 
position, however, that “[a]bsent an extraordinary circumstance such 
as the one encountered in Sears, Roebuck,76 [it would] not review the 
denial of a motion for summary judgment once the district court . . . 
conducted a full trial on the merits.”77 Still, it is clear from the 
context that, in taking this position, the court had in mind situations 
in which summary judgment was denied on the basis of genuine 
issues of material fact.78 When an occasion arose to review post-
judgment a denial of summary judgment that posed an issue of law, 
unmixed with disputed issues of fact, the court proceeded to do the 
review and reverse the district court.79
The Ninth Circuit recognizes that a denial of summary 
judgment is not properly before the court of appeals after judgment 
predicated on a jury trial where the trial court found genuine issues 
75. See Trs. of Ind. Univ. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 920 F.2d 429, 433 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (explaining that “the district court’s refusal to rule on the applicability of” 
a “warranty, as a matter of law, because it substantially affected the issues that were 
tried and upon which judgment was entered, was an interlocutory decision that can 
be challenged in this appeal from the final judgment”).
76. See supra text accompanying note 74.
77. Watson v. Amedco Steel, Inc., 29 F.3d 274, 278 (7th Cir. 1994).
78. See id.
79. Grun v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 163 F.3d 411, 419, 425 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(rejecting the contention that the court lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of 
summary judgment, even after a dismissal for want of prosecution, noting that the 
proper appeal of a final judgment brings up all issues resolved by the trial court, and 
directing summary judgment for Grun on his breach of contract claim); see also 
Tuohey v. Chi. Park Dist., 148 F.3d 735, 736, 739 & n.5 (7th Cir. 1998) (involving 
an appeal by an employee who argued “that the district court should have entered 
judgment as a matter of law in her favor based on the findings of the [employer’s] 
human rights officer,” noting that Tuohey’s motion was styled a motion for 
summary judgment, and concluding that the bindingness of the officer’s report was 
“a potentially dispositive legal question that [was] not rendered moot by . . . trial,” 
and that the court of appeals could consider on appeal the district court’s decision to 
deny preclusive effect to the report); Rekhi v. Wildwood Indus., Inc., 61 F.3d 1313, 
1318 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that “the principle that an order denying summary 
judgment is rendered moot by trial . . . is intended for cases in which the basis for 
the denial was that the party opposing the motion had presented enough evidence to 
go to trial” and holding that defendant’s res judicata defense was “not extinguished 
merely because [it was] presented and denied at the summary judgment stage”; 
when plaintiff went on to win, the defendant could reassert the res judicata defense 
on appeal).
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of material fact.80 In a passage that numerous circuits later quoted, 
the Ninth Circuit stated in Locricchio v. Legal Services Corp.:
[T]he party moving for summary judgment suffers an injustice if his 
motion is improperly denied. This is true even if the jury decides in his 
favor. The injustice arguably is greater when the verdict goes against him. 
However, we believe it would be even more unjust to deprive a party of a 
jury verdict after the evidence was fully presented, on the basis of an 
appellate court’s review of whether the pleadings and affidavits at the 
time of the summary judgment motion demonstrated the need for a trial.81
At the same time, on several occasions the Ninth Circuit has agreed 
to address, after final judgment, whether denial of an earlier motion 
for summary judgment was erroneous where the denial was based on 
an alleged error of law.82 To review the decision of a legal issue 
posed by a summary judgment motion, it has said, is very different 
from “engag[ing] in the ‘pointless academic exercise’” of deciding 
whether a factual issue was disputed after it has been decided.83
The Tenth Circuit follows the principles adopted by the Ninth 
Circuit as to the usual case of summary judgments denied because of 
genuine issues of material fact, adding language that courts 
elsewhere found attractive. It noted that parties should not be 
permitted to use summary judgment motions as a “bomb” that could 
be set early in the litigation and then detonate, to the surprise of the 
80. JJCO, Inc. v. Isuzu Motors Am., Inc., 492 F. App’x 715, 718 (9th Cir. 
2012) (citing Locricchio v. Legal Servs. Corp., 833 F.2d 1352, 1359 (9th Cir. 
1987)).
81. 833 F.2d at 1359 (emphasis added). 
82. See, e.g., Banuelos v. Constr. Laborers’ Trust Funds, 382 F.3d 897, 902, 
904-05 (9th Cir. 2004) (taking the position that the general rule—against reviewing 
summary judgment denials after trial on the merits—“does not apply to those denials 
of summary judgment motions where the district court made an error of law that, if 
not made, would have required the district court to grant the motion,” reversing the 
denial of summary judgment and vacating the judgment that the district court had 
entered because “the district court erred [in] concluding [that] it could hear evidence 
that was not in the administrative record” and, had it considered only evidence 
within that record, it would have had to grant plaintiff’s summary judgment motion); 
accord Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(reviewing denial of summary judgment after trial and judgment because the appeal 
challenged the district court’s ruling on a question of law); Pavon v. Swift Transp. 
Co., 192 F.3d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 1999) (post-jury trial and judgment, reviewing the 
denial of summary judgment sought on the basis of claim preclusion, noting that the 
preclusion question was a question of law, and reasoning that, if a district court 
denies a motion for summary judgment on the basis of a question of law that would 
have negated the need for trial, the appellate court should review that decision). 
83. Pavon, 192 F.3d at 906 (quoting Lum v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 963 
F.2d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 1992)).
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opposing party, on appeal from final judgment.84 But in 1994, in 
Ruyle v. Continental Oil Co., the Tenth Circuit adopted the 
exception, allowing post-trial, post-judgment appeals of denials of 
summary judgment based upon legal conclusions rather than upon 
genuine issues of material fact, and held that the legal issues would 
be preserved for appeal and that a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a 
matter of law—which it found inapt—would not be needed to raise 
the legal issues.85 After jury trial and judgment, the D.C. Circuit too 
has reviewed denials of summary judgment that raised questions of 
law.86
The foregoing survey indicates significant support in the 
intermediate federal appellate courts for post-trial, post-judgment 
review of summary judgment denials when the issue presented is a 
question of law and not a question of whether the trial court was 
correct to allow the case to proceed because it found disputed issues 
of material fact on the record that existed at the time of a summary 
judgment motion and its decision. The Supreme Court perceived the 
circuits to have divided,87 and granted certiorari in Ortiz v. Jordan to 
84. Whalen v. Unit Rig, Inc., 974 F.2d. 1248, 1251 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(quoting Holley v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Servs., Inc., 835 F.2d 1375, 1377 
(11th Cir. 1988)).
85. 44 F.3d 837, 841 (10th Cir. 1994). 
86. Kropinski v. World Plan Exec. Council-US, 853 F.2d 948, 950-51, 957 
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (reviewing denial in part of defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment on all claims, asserting that the facts alleged by Kropinski failed to state a 
cause of action for fraud, negligence, or intentional tort, and that the claims were 
barred by the District’s three-year statute of limitations, and concluding that the 
district court erred in allowing one negligence claim and certain aspects of the fraud 
claim to go to trial).
87. There are so many cases concerning the post-judgment appealability of 
summary judgment denials that it is difficult to confidently characterize the 
positions of the circuits. While my best efforts to characterize the positions of the 
circuits are reflected in the preceding text, other commentators have come to 
somewhat different conclusions. For example, one author, writing in 2011, found 
that the Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits made no legal-question exception to 
their refusal to entertain post-trial appeals from summary judgment denials, while 
the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits did make such an exception. Paul S. 
Morin, Note, The New Temporal Prime Directive: Ortiz & the Death of Post-trial 
Appeals from Pre-trial Summary Judgment Denials, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 205, 218 
(2012). He did not comment on the position of the other circuits in this regard. Id.
Another commentator, writing in 2010, placed the Second, Eighth, Tenth, and 
Federal Circuits, in addition to the circuits mentioned above, in the camp accepting 
the legal-question exception. Jenike-Godshalk, supra note 29, at 1604 & n.56, 1605, 
1606 & n.65, 1607. See generally, John R. Spade, Comment, Feld v. Feld: The 
Federal Circuit Split over Post-Trial Appeals from Pre-Trial Summary Judgment 
Denials Asserting Purely Legal Issues, 37 AM J. TRIAL ADVOC. 447 (2013) 
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resolve the question whether a party may “appeal an order denying 
summary judgment . . . after a district court has conducted a full trial 
on the merits.”88
II. ORTIZ
In Ortiz, a former inmate brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit 
against prison officials, alleging that she had been twice sexually 
assaulted by a prison guard when she was incarcerated, and that 
prison officials had failed to protect her against the second assault 
and instead had retaliated against her for reporting the incident, by 
placing her, “shackled and handcuffed, in[to] solitary confinement[,] 
in a cell without adequate heat, clothing, bedding, or blankets,” in 
violation of her Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.89 The 
principal defendants, Jordan and Bright, a case manager at Ortiz’s 
living unit and a prison investigator, moved for summary judgment 
on the basis of qualified immunity, arguing that they should be 
shielded from suit because their conduct did not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which they, as 
reasonable persons, should have known.90 The trial judge denied the 
motion, concluding that there were genuine issues of material fact 
upon which both plaintiff’s claim and defendants’ claim to qualified 
immunity depended.91 Neither defendant appealed the district judge’s 
denial of summary judgment.92
(surveying the law and reaching some of the same conclusions as this Article 
reaches). 
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari in Ortiz v. Jordan argued that the 
circuits are divided, with some recognizing a “legal question” exception to the 
general rule that denials of summary judgment may not be appealed after a full trial 
on the merits, and others rejecting such an exception to the general rule, and that the 
circuits were further divided, with some allowing post-trial appeals that could have 
been raised before trial, and others rejecting such appeals. Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 2, 10-15, Ortiz v. Jordan, 131 S. Ct. 884 (2011) (No. 09-737). 
Respondents minimized the circuit splits, arguing in part that only the Fourth Circuit 
was plainly opposed to post-trial appeals of summary judgment denials, and that no 
clear split existed as to the second alleged circuit split. Brief in Opposition to 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, 20, Ortiz, 131 S. Ct. 884 (No. 09-737).
88. 131 S. Ct. 884, 888-89, 891 (2011).
89. Id. at 888.
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 890.
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The jury returned verdicts against both defendants.93 The trial 
court entered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict.94 On
appeal, Jordan and Bright argued both that the district court erred in 
failing to grant them summary judgment based on their qualified 
immunity defense and that the verdict was against the weight of the 
evidence.95 While the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
recognized96 that appeals courts “‘normally do not review the denial 
of a summary judgment motion after a trial on the merits,’” it found 
that “‘denial . . . based on qualified immunity is an exception to this 
rule.’”97 Appraising the evidence de novo, the Sixth Circuit reversed 
the judgment on the jury verdict, holding that qualified immunity 
shielded both defendants from Ortiz’s suit.98
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the circuit-
splitting question, “May a party . . . appeal an order denying 
summary judgment after a full trial on the merits?”99 The Court 
immediately answered with an unqualified “no.”100
The Court reasoned that an order denying summary judgment
retains its interlocutory character as simply a step along the route to final 
judgment. Once the case proceeds to trial, the full record developed in 
court supersedes the record existing at the time of the summary judgment 
motion. . . . The plea [of qualified immunity] remains available to the 
defending officials at trial; but at that stage, the defense must be evaluated 
in light of the character and quality of the evidence received in court[, not 
by reference to the summary judgment record]. . . . After trial, if 
defendants continue to urge qualified immunity, the decisive question, 
ordinarily, is whether the evidence favoring the party seeking relief is 
legally sufficient to overcome the defense.101
The Court went on to say that, in the instant case, although the Sixth 
Circuit purported to review the district judge’s denial of the prison
officials’ pre-trial summary judgment motion, it actually relied in 
part on evidence presented only at trial.102 Thus, the appeals court 
erred in characterizing its review as review of the summary judgment 
93. Id. at 888.
94. Id. at 891.
95. Id.
96. This was the Supreme Court’s characterization. Id. at 888.
97. Id. (quoting Ortiz v. Jordan, 316 F. App’x 449, 453 (6th Cir. 2009)).
98. See id. at 891.
99. Id. at 888-89.
100. Id. at 889.
101. Id. (citation omitted).
102. Id.
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denial.103 The more important (and correlative) infirmity in its 
decision, however, was rooted in the court of appeals’ lack of 
authority to review the district judge’s appraisal of the trial evidence 
where defendants had not contested the jury’s finding of liability by 
renewing their motion for judgment as a matter of law, under Rule 
50(b), after the jury reached its decision.104 Nor did defendants 
request a new trial under Rule 59, as Rule 50(b) contemplates that 
litigants may do.105
In Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., the 
Court had held that, absent a post-verdict Rule 50(b) motion for 
judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial, based 
on the insufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court lacks power 
to review the sufficiency of the evidence at trial.106 The Court in 
Ortiz held that, to the extent the defendant officials argued that Ortiz 
had not proven her case on the facts, they were raising a sufficiency-
of-the-evidence challenge, but were precluded from doing so by 
Unitherm in view of their failure to make a post-verdict Rule 50 
motion.107 In other words, when summary judgment is sought on the 
basis of qualified immunity, but is denied based on the presence of 
genuine issues of material fact, rather than by dint of conclusions of 
103. Id.
104. Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 provides in relevant part that:
(a) Judgment as a Matter of Law. 
. . . . 
(2) Motion. A motion for judgment as a matter of law may be made at 
any time before the case is submitted to the jury. The motion must 
specify the judgment sought and the law and facts that entitle the 
movant to the judgment.
(b) Renewing the Motion After Trial; Alternative Motion for a New Trial. 
If the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made 
under Rule 50(a), the court is considered to have submitted the action to 
the jury subject to the court’s later deciding the legal questions raised by 
the motion. No later than 28 days after the entry of judgment—or if the 
motion addresses a jury issue not decided by a verdict, no later than 28 
days after the jury was discharged—the movant may file a renewed 
motion for judgment as a matter of law and may include an alternative or 
joint request for a new trial under Rule 59. In ruling on the renewed 
motion, the court may:
(1) allow judgment on the verdict, if the jury returned a verdict;
(2) order a new trial; or
(3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law.
FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a), (b).
105. Ortiz, 131 S. Ct. at 891; FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b).
106. 546 U.S. 394, 400-01 (2006).
107. Ortiz, 131 S. Ct. at 891-93.
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law, that denial is not appealable after final judgment because it is 
the trial court record that matters after final judgment, not what the 
factual record was back at the time the summary judgment motion 
was made.108 At trial, whether there are genuine issues of material 
fact is to be determined upon a motion for judgment as a matter of 
law, and the proper way to raise issues of evidentiary insufficiency in 
cases that go all the way to verdict is by a post-verdict Rule 50 
motion.109 Absent such a motion, the losing party waives the issue.110
In this aspect, the Ortiz Court merely applied its decision in 
Unitherm.111
The three justices who concurred in the judgment in Ortiz
(Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Kennedy) criticized the majority for 
reaching the Rule 50 point.112 They would have left it to be 
considered on remand, in part because, in their view, the court of 
appeals “saw itself as reviewing the interlocutory order denying 
summary judgment,” notwithstanding the court’s alleged 
consideration of the trial record, and in part because the Rule 50 
issues were not addressed by the court of appeals and were not even 
raised until defendants’ responsive brief in the Supreme Court.113 As 
to the reviewability of denials of motions for summary judgment, the 
concurring Justices noted (as had the majority)—but erroneously, all 
the same—that the time for filing an appeal of an immediately 
appealable denial of summary judgment114 usually will have run by 
the conclusion of trial, as a notice of appeal generally must be filed 
within thirty days after entry of the order.115 Thus, they viewed the 
appeal of the denial of summary judgment as time-barred and, 
therefore, beyond the court of appeals’ jurisdiction.116 The concurring 
Justices would have reversed the judgment on that ground alone.117
108. Id. at 889.
109. Unitherm, 546 U.S. at 400-06.
110. Id.
111. Ortiz, 131 S. Ct. at 891-93.
112. Id. at 893-94 (Thomas, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 894-95.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 6-10, 13-26.
115. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) (2012) (“Except as 
otherwise provided in this section, no appeal shall bring any judgment, order or 
decree in an action, suit or proceeding of a civil nature before a court of appeals for 
review unless notice of appeal is filed, within thirty days after the entry of such 
judgment, order or decree.”).
116. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 206-07 (2007) (noting that the Court 
had “long and repeatedly held that the time limits for filing a notice of appeal are 
jurisdictional in nature” and “hold[ing] that petitioner’s untimely notice [of 
appeal]—even though filed in reliance upon a [d]istrict [c]ourt’s order—deprived 
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With respect to the portion of the Court’s opinion having to do 
with post-judgment review of a summary judgment denial, several 
matters should be noted. First and most importantly, the Court here 
declined to address the question that it perceived had split the 
circuits, the question that had prompted the Court to grant certiorari, 
namely, whether a party may appeal an order denying summary 
judgment after a district court has conducted a full trial on the merits 
and entered final judgment when the summary judgment motion 
presented a question of law and the trial court’s resolution of that 
question was the basis of its denial of summary judgment.118 The 
Court would not have granted certiorari intending merely to hold that 
in this case the denial of summary judgment rested on genuine issues 
of material fact and that, in that circumstance, the denial was not 
reviewable after trial on the merits, leading to a final judgment. Even 
prior to Ortiz, the courts of appeals all had agreed that a post-trial 
appeal of the denial of a summary judgment motion should be 
rejected in such circumstances, at least when it was not presented in 
a cross-appeal. Yet, that is all the Court decided.119
the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals of jurisdiction”); accord Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 
236, 247 (1998); Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 314-15 (1988); 
Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978); see also 15A CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3901 (2d ed. 1992) (“The rule is well settled that failure to file a 
timely notice of appeal defeats the jurisdiction of a court of appeals.”).
117. Ortiz, 131 S. Ct. at 894 (Thomas, J., concurring).
118. See id. at 889, 891 (majority opinion).
119. One student author has taken the position that Ortiz held 
“unqualified[ly] . . . against post-trial appeals from . . . summary judgment denials,” 
and that reading it to permit exceptions “cannot be reconciled with the opinion in its 
entirety.” Morin, supra note 87, at 224-25. It is true that the Court broadly stated 
both the issue on which it granted certiorari—whether a party may “appeal an order 
denying summary judgment after a full trial on the merits”—and its purported 
answer, offering an unqualified “no.” Ortiz, 131 S. Ct. at 888-89. But those words 
do not render the unqualified “no” the holding of the case. The holding of a case 
must reflect the issue actually decided. A holding “involves a determination of a 
matter of law that is pivotal to a judicial decision,” as contrasted with obiter dicta,
“tangential comments” or “non-dispositive remarks[, typically] in a majority 
opinion.” BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 405, 607 
(2d ed. 1995); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1177 (9th ed. 2009) (defining 
obiter dictum as “[a] judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but 
one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential 
(although it may be considered persuasive)”). In Ortiz, the Court explicitly did not 
decide whether, after final judgment, a losing litigant could appeal a denial of 
summary judgment that raised only questions of law; it decided instead that here 
“the officials’ claims of qualified immunity” did not “present ‘purely legal’ issues 
capable of resolution ‘with reference only to undisputed facts,’” and that—in that 
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Second, Ortiz’s observation that the time to seek review of the 
summary judgment denial expired well in advance of final judgment 
is incorrect for two reasons. As noted earlier, an interlocutory appeal 
of a denial of summary judgment to a defendant who has invoked 
immunity from suit is available only with respect to questions of law, 
not with respect to district court determinations that genuine issues 
of material fact preclude summary judgment.120 The fact that Jordan 
and Bright did not seek immediately to appeal the denial of their 
summary judgment motion was unsurprising in light of the 
grounding of that denial in the trial court’s conclusion that genuine 
issues of material fact precluded summary judgment.121 Thus, a 
federal court of appeals would have rejected an effort by the Ortiz
defendants to take an interlocutory appeal of the denial of their 
motion for summary judgment under the collateral order doctrine. 
The first occasion for them to appeal that ruling was after final 
judgment.
Moreover, even when an interlocutory appeal of a denial of an 
immunity-based motion for summary judgment would be proper, the 
federal courts generally do not require such an appeal to be taken 
within thirty days of the entry of that order.122 The appeal is 
permissive, not mandatory, and the party injured by the denial does 
not waive its right to appeal the denial after final judgment by failing 
to bring an interlocutory appeal.123 Although a defendant who fails to 
circumstance—the denial of summary judgment was not appealable after trial on the 
merits. 131 S. Ct. at 892 (quoting Brief of Respondents at 11, 16, Ortiz, 131 S. Ct. 
884 (No. 09-737)). Thus, its holding is correspondingly limited. It is the broad and 
unqualified language that is dicta, rather than the other way around.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
121. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995). While defendants 
argued that, in challenging the denial of their summary judgment motion, they were 
raising a purely legal question, the Supreme Court found otherwise. See supra note 
119. This case turned, not on a dispute about the substance or clarity of pre-existing 
law—which was not in controversy in this case—but on controverted facts:
Was Jordan adequately informed, after the first assault, of the identity of 
the assailant, and of Ortiz’s fear of a further assault? What, if anything, 
could Jordan have done to distance Ortiz from the assailant, thereby 
insulating her against a second assault? Did Bright place and retain Ortiz 
in solitary confinement as a retaliatory measure or as a control needed to 
safeguard the integrity of the investigation?
Id. at 892-93 (citations omitted). This was why the Court concluded that it did not 
need to address the question of whether, after trial and final judgment, a losing 
litigant could appeal a denial of summary judgment that raised only questions of 
law. Id. at 892. That question was not presented.
122. See infra text accompanying notes 141-149.
123. See infra text accompanying notes 141-149.
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immediately appeal the rejection of his claim to qualified immunity 
from suit loses some of the benefits of that immunity, he or she may 
appeal after final judgment the decision or decisions in which the 
rejection was manifested.124 A fortiori, the time to appeal cannot have 
expired on an appeal that was not even permissible.
We will return below to issues including the timeliness of a 
post-judgment appeal of a denial of summary judgment. Before
considering that issue among others, we briefly examine the courts of 
appeals’ decisions in the wake of Ortiz to see how it affected them.
III. COURTS OF APPEALS’ DECISIONS IN THE WAKE OF ORTIZ
In the wake of Ortiz, some federal appellate courts have 
refused to afford post-judgment review to denials of motions for 
summary judgment, ostensibly regardless of the basis for the denial, 
that is, regardless of whether summary judgment was denied because 
the district judge found genuine issues of material fact or because the 
district judge held that the moving party was not entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. They have cited Ortiz as unqualifiedly answering 
that, after a full trial on the merits, a party may not appeal an order 
denying summary judgment. Often, however, their reading and 
application of Ortiz came in cases in which the appellant was asking 
the court to review whether the evidence submitted before trial was 
sufficient to withstand a summary judgment motion.125 In other 
words, a number of federal intermediate appellate courts have 
applied Ortiz when the question was not whether the court could, 
after trial and judgment, address a legal issue that the denied 
124. See infra text accompanying notes 141-149.
125. E.g., Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1322 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013) (finding no error in the denial of summary judgment and, adding that 
“[t]o the extent that [the appellant] attempts to couch as a claim construction issue 
the denial of summary judgment of infringement, . . . ‘a denial of summary 
judgment is not properly reviewable on an appeal from the final judgment entered 
after trial’” (quoting Glaros v. H.H. Robertson Co., 797 F.2d 1564, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 
1986))); Pensacola Motor Sales Inc. v. E. Shore Toyota, LLC, 684 F.3d 1211, 1219-
20, 1226 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Ortiz and holding that, after trial on the merits, 
defendant could not appeal an order denying summary judgment, but reviewing 
denials of Rule 50 motions for judgment as a matter of law based on the sufficiency 
of the evidence (citing Ortiz, 131 S. Ct. at 888-89)); A.D. v. Markgraf, 636 F.3d 
555, 559 (9th Cir. 2011) (refusing to review denial of a motion for summary 
judgment based upon qualified immunity since then there was a jury verdict adverse 
to the defendant, but reviewing and reversing the district court’s denial of 
defendant’s Rule 50 motions, which also were predicated on qualified immunity 
(citing Ortiz, 131 S. Ct. at 888-89)). 
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summary judgment motion had posed and that the trial court had 
answered in its ruling on the summary judgment motion. 
Other federal appellate courts have continued to distinguish 
between denials based on genuine issues of material fact and denials 
based on legal conclusions. In Copar Pumice Co. v. Morris, for 
instance, the Tenth Circuit said in dicta—as it would have said 
before Ortiz—that a denial of summary judgment based on a pure 
legal question is appealable after final judgment, but it held—as it 
would have held before Ortiz—that where summary judgment, 
sought on the basis of qualified immunity in a § 1983 action, was 
denied because of material factual disputes, defendants’ withdrawal 
of their post-judgment motion for judgment as a matter of law 
rendered their qualified immunity argument one that the appeals 
court could not hear.126 The court recognized that some language in 
Ortiz appeared to undermine Tenth Circuit precedents that held a 
denial of summary judgment based on the decision of a purely legal 
question to be appealable after final judgment,127 but it found that the 
Supreme Court had not announced a categorical rule, and had not 
addressed the correctness of decisions such as those the Tenth 
Circuit had reached, because the facts of Ortiz had not presented 
purely legal issues.128
Ortiz has engendered some confusion, however. In Nolfi v. 
Ohio Kentucky Oil Corp., the Sixth Circuit said, on the one hand, 
that Ortiz overturned the circuit’s “prior rule permitting some 
summary judgment appeals after a jury trial”—permitting appeals 
126. 639 F.3d 1025, 1030-31 (10th Cir. 2011).
127. Id. at 1031.
128. See id. (citing Ortiz, 131 S. Ct. at 892); see also Plascenia v. Taylor, 
514 F. App’x 711 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that an exception allowing post-
judgment appeal of summary judgment denials, based on legal holdings, survived 
Ortiz); Kennedy v. City of Cincinnati, 483 F. App’x 110, 111-12 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, a post-judgment appeal from denial of 
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in a § 1983 action, concluding that 
Kennedy’s appeal was not of a purely legal nature, that the district court had denied 
summary judgment on the ground that disputed questions of fact remained; 
concluding that Ortiz precluded “inquiry into whether the evidence presented” in 
connection with the summary judgment motion merited judgment as a matter of law, 
once a case proceeded to trial, and that this case required just such an inquiry); 
Owatonna Clinic–Mayo Health Sys. v. Med. Protective Co., 639 F.3d 806, 810 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (viewing Ortiz as having punted on the issue whether a denial of 
summary judgment based on a purely legal question is appealable after final 
judgment, and finding it unnecessary to resolve in this case, where it found that 
“Medical Protective’s real complaint [was] not that the district court erred in 
denying its motion for summary judgment”) (emphasis added). 
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where the ruling was based on questions of law and a determination 
that there were no disputed facts—and held that a party may not 
appeal an order denying summary judgment after a full trial on the 
merits.129 At the same time, the Sixth Circuit concluded that it could 
and would consider the purely legal issue, raised by defendant on 
summary judgment, whether plaintiffs’ loss-causation theory was 
actionable under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,130
because Ortiz left open the possibility that cases “‘involv[ing] . . . 
[only] disputes about the substance and clarity of pre-existing law’ 
may still be considered.”131 But then what aspect of prior Sixth 
Circuit precedent did Ortiz overrule? “Because most of defendants’ 
summary judgment appeal [was] based on the evidence presented 
prior to trial,” the court concluded that Ortiz precluded it from 
reviewing the summary judgment denial “in large part.”132 It would 
seem that, while this statement is accurate, pre-existing Sixth Circuit 
precedent also would have precluded the circuit from reviewing the 
denial of summary judgment insofar as it rested on factual matters.
In other instances since Ortiz, federal appellate courts have 
refused to afford post-judgment review to denials of motions for 
summary judgment where those denials were based on the district 
judge’s conclusion that the moving party was not entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law but where, in the appellate court’s view, 
the losing party preserved the legal issue by making a Rule 50(a) 
motion for judgment as a matter of law before the case was 
submitted to the jury and a Rule 50(b) motion after verdict.133 In such 
circumstances, the court purported to reach the question of law upon 
which the denial of summary judgment turned, but reached it through 
review of the Rule 50 decisions, rather than through review of the 
summary judgment denial per se.
129. 675 F.3d 538, 544-45 (6th Cir. 2012).
130. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
131. Nolfi, 675 F.3d at 545 (quoting Ortiz, 131 S. Ct. at 892).
132. Id. 
133. E.g., Black v. J.I. Case Co., 22 F.3d 568, 572 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating 
that when a motion for summary judgment has been denied, the movant should seek 
recourse through a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law, and reviewing 
denial of motion for directed verdict); see also Whalen v. Unit Rig, Inc., 974 F.2d 
1248, 1251 (10th Cir. 1992) (disallowing post-trial appeal from denial of summary 
judgment based on existence of genuine issues of material fact, but reviewing denial 
of motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict).
932 Michigan State Law Review 2014:895
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Should Interlocutory Appeals of Summary Judgment Denials Be 
More Freely Available to Reduce the Occasions for Post-
Judgment Review?
Because of the uncertainty surrounding the availability of post-
trial, post-judgment appeals of summary judgment denials and the 
Supreme Court’s opposition to them, it is worth considering whether
interlocutory appeals of summary judgment denials should be more 
freely available. 
Efforts to make interlocutory appeals of summary judgment 
denials more freely available—at least in particular categories of 
cases—have been made, sometimes successfully, in federal courts 
and in state courts.134 Consider the incentives created by liberal 
allowance of interlocutory appeal of summary judgment denials, 
however. Provisions that authorize interlocutory appeals of summary 
judgment denials may deter plaintiffs from suing, in the authorizing 
court systems, on claims that fall within the authorizing statute, if the 
plaintiffs have the choice of suing in a court system that does not 
134. For example, under Texas’ Civil Practice and Remedies Code, as 
amended in 1993, the losing party may appeal an interlocutory order that 
denies a motion for summary judgment that is based in whole or in part 
upon a claim against or defense by a member of the electronic or print 
media . . . arising under the . . . First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, or Article I, Section 8, of the Texas Constitution, or Chapter 
73 [of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code]. 
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(6) (West 2013). However, if the 
denial of the summary judgment is affirmed, the court of appeals must order the 
appealing media defendant to pay all costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees for the 
appeal. Id. § 51.015. See generally Thomas J. Williams, Media Law: Interlocutory 
Appeal, 67 TEX. B.J. 760 (2004). In the federal system, Section 1803 of Title 50 
gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction over appeals from interlocutory orders 
granting or denying a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment in civil actions 
brought under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. See 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1803(a)(1) (2012). The Act creates a private right of action for money damages, 
including punitive damages, for a person who has been subjected to electronic 
surveillance without statutory authority or about whom information obtained by 
electronic surveillance has been disclosed or used knowing, or having reason to 
know, that the information was obtained through electronic surveillance without 
statutory authority. Id. § 1810. Any person who committed the violation may be 
sued. Id. However, it is a defense that the defendant was a law enforcement or 
investigative officer engaged in official duties, if the “surveillance was authorized 
by and conducted pursuant to a search warrant or court order of a court of competent 
jurisdiction.” Id. § 1809(b). 
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allow such interlocutory appeals.135 This suggests that expanding the 
availability of interlocutory appeals of summary judgment denials in 
federal court could deter plaintiffs from suing in federal court 
because defendants could delay the progress of plaintiffs’ suits and 
increase the costs of those suits by bringing interlocutory appeals of 
denials of defendants’ summary judgment motions, although 
plaintiffs too would enjoy the ability to bring such an interlocutory 
appeal if their motions for summary judgment were denied. The 
ability to delay litigation with such appeals might even encourage 
more defendants to file unmeritorious motions for summary 
judgment, further burdening the litigants and the trial courts. 
Presumably, we do not want to deter plaintiffs’ filings in federal 
court, at least when plaintiffs’ claims arise under federal law.
Such authorizing provisions in state courts, when there is no 
comparable provision in federal courts, also may deter removals, 
whereas, if federal courts were to offer similarly liberal interlocutory 
appeals of summary judgment denials, defendants would not lose 
this procedural advantage if they removed. We may not want to 
encourage removals, particularly of cases asserting no federal 
question claims, however. While federal policy on interlocutory 
appeals of summary judgment denials should not be greatly affected 
by the reduction in deterrence of removal that a shift in federal 
policy might create, this is a factor that marginally weighs against 
liberally permitting interlocutory appeals of summary judgment 
denials in federal court. 
Further, we should be cognizant that the potential for an 
interlocutory appeal from the denial of a defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment gives defendants added leverage in settling cases 
in which such interlocutory appeals may be taken. While one might 
say the same for plaintiffs who are potential appellants on summary 
judgment denials, in reality defendants are more likely to be movants 
for summary judgment as their burden often is lower than plaintiffs’ 
burden on a motion for summary judgment,136 and defendants often 
135. See Williams, supra note 134, at 760. A discussion of forum shopping 
between state and federal court may bring to mind the question whether the 
doctrines of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), or Hanna v. 
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), are relevant. The questions whether and when federal 
court rulings are reviewable and appealable are procedural matters that are governed 
by Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure and by federal common law, and 
are not influenced by state procedural rules on analogous matters.  
136. Defendants who move for summary judgment ordinarily have to show 
that a reasonable jury could find for them in order to shift to the plaintiff a burden of 
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are better able to withstand the costs of interlocutory appeal and 
frequently are benefited, rather than disadvantaged, by the delay that 
such appeals impose. Additionally, the possibility that a denial of a 
summary judgment motion will be reversed by the appellate court on 
interlocutory appeal will assist a defendant to settle a case on 
favorable terms.137
The above factors, taken together with the federal system’s 
general preference for post-judgment appeals,138 and its provision for 
interlocutory appeals only when there are strong reasons for 
departing from the norm—as evidenced by the narrow circumstances 
in which 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) and (b),139 Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 23(f) and 54(b)140 appeals, pendent appellate jurisdiction, 
going forward with evidence. This position is associated with Martin B. Louis, 
Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745, 749 
(1974), and is the majority rule, although some commentators have argued for either 
more onerous or less onerous burdens. Compare David P. Currie, Thoughts on 
Directed Verdicts and Summary Judgments, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 72, 76-79 (1978) 
(proposing that a motion for summary judgment, without more, should put an 
opposing party with the burden of proof at trial to the burden of producing evidence 
sufficient to sustain a verdict in his favor), with Jeffrey W. Stempel & Steven S. 
Gensler, Chapter 56: Summary Judgment, in 11 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.40[1][b] (3d ed. 2014) (proposing that a moving party 
without the burden of proof at trial should have to show that a reasonable jury would 
have to find for him, to shift to the non-movant a burden of coming forward with 
evidence sufficient to sustain a verdict in his favor). A defendant who moves for 
summary judgment on the basis of an affirmative defense has the burden of proof 
with respect to that defense; however, such a defendant has to show that a 
reasonable jury would have to find for him, in order to shift to the plaintiff a burden 
of going forward with evidence. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 
337-38 (1986) (outlining, in both the majority and dissenting opinions, the standard 
to be applied to determine whether a movant for summary judgment has met his 
initial burden); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) 
(holding that the court must take into account the magnitude of the burden of proof 
at trial, when applying the standards for summary judgment).
137. See Williams, supra note 134, at 761.
138. See supra note 7.
139. For pertinent parts of the text of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(a)(1) and 1292(b), 
see supra notes 8-9. Subsections (a)(2) and (3) of section 1292(a) respectively afford 
appellate jurisdiction over “[i]nterlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing 
orders to wind up receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes” of 
receiverships, and interlocutory decrees “determining the rights and liabilities of the 
parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed.” 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2)-(3) (2012).
140. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) provides: 
APPEALS. A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting 
or denying class-action certification under this rule if a petition for 
permission to appeal is filed with the circuit clerk within 14 days after the 
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and mandamus are permitted141—argue persuasively against liberal 
allowance of interlocutory appeals of summary judgment denials. 
Liberally allowing such interlocutory appeals would create far 
greater problems than it would solve.
B. Are Pre-Judgment Appeals of Denials of Summary Judgment 
Mandatory or Permissive? Should Such Appeals Be Mandatory or 
Permissive?
As discussed earlier, most interlocutory orders are not 
immediately appealable; their review has to wait until the entry of 
final judgment.142 In the federal courts, the law generally is that 
immediate appeals of orders entered prior to final judgment—when 
interlocutory appeals are permitted—are merely permissive.143 That 
permissive, but not mandatory, nature characterizes appeals that can 
be taken pursuant to §§ 1292(a) and (b), collateral order appeals, 
Rule 23(f) appeals, pendent appellate jurisdiction appeals, and 
petitions for mandamus.144 Appeals from denials of summary 
order is entered. An appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court 
unless the district judge or the court of appeals so orders. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides: 
JUDGMENT ON MULTIPLE CLAIMS OR INVOLVING MULTIPLE PARTIES. When 
an action presents more than one claim for relief–whether as a claim, 
counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim–or when multiple parties 
are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or 
more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly 
determines that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or 
other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the 
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end 
the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time 
before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the 
parties’ rights and liabilities. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 10, 14-17.
142. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981) 
(holding that a party ordinarily must raise all claims of error in a single appeal 
following final judgment on the merits); see supra note 7.
143. Habitat Educ. Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 607 F.3d 453, 456 (7th Cir. 
2010).
144. E.g., id. (declaring that “[e]ven when an interlocutory order is 
immediately appealable, the party adversely affected . . . can wait and challenge it 
later, on appeal from the final judgment, provided . . . that the order hasn’t become 
moot,” citing earlier Seventh Circuit precedent permitting post-final judgment 
appeal of an injunction bond that was immediately appealable when entered). See 
generally 15A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 116, § 3905.1 (“The 
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judgment where the motions were predicated on assertions of 
absolute or qualified immunity similarly are permissive.145 The sole 
exception is appeals under Rule 54(b). Rule 54(b) appeals are treated 
differently because the purpose of that Rule is to both enable and, if 
prohibition against immediate appeal of most pretrial and trial orders established by 
the final judgment rule is offset by the rule that once appeal is taken from a truly 
final judgment that ends the litigation, earlier rulings generally can be reviewed. . . . 
These costs [of maintaining the final judgment rule] would be aggravated if the 
opportunity for review on appeal from the ultimate final judgment were subject to 
forfeiture on the ground that some interlocutory event could have been appealed as 
if a final judgment under one or another of the expansive interpretations placed on 
the final judgment requirement.”); George C. Pratt, Interlocutory Orders, in 19
JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 203.10[7][a] (3d ed. 2014) 
(discussing non-obligatory nature of appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)); Id.
§ 203.10[1][a] (addressing the interlocutory appeal of preliminary injunction 
rulings). 
145. Spalding v. Mason, 161 U.S. 375, 381 (1896) (holding that despite the 
failure to take an interlocutory cross-appeal of principles upon which an accounting 
was to be done, the earlier order was appealable upon appeal from final judgment, 
when the entire record was brought up for review); Stewart v. Beach, 701 F.3d 1322, 
1329 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting that to the extent a denial of summary judgment based 
upon qualified immunity turned on the purely legal question of whether a 
constitutional right was clearly established, it remained appealable after final 
judgment despite the litigant’s foregone right to take an immediate appeal of the 
order under the collateral order doctrine); Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 
486, 493 (3d Cir. 1997) (applying the usual rule that interlocutory appeal is 
permissive to denials of summary judgment sought on immunity grounds); Kiser v. 
Garrett, 67 F.3d 1166, 1169 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Qualified immunity is not waived 
when a defendant fails to take an interlocutory appeal and, instead, subjects himself 
to discovery and trial. It would be anomalous to conclude that a defendant waives a
qualified immunity defense by dismissing as moot an interlocutory appeal that the 
defendant was not required to take in the first place.”) (citation omitted); Kurowski 
v. Krajewski, 848 F.2d 767, 772-73 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Until a judgment is rendered 
‘final’ by entry of a separate document[,] . . . no one need appeal. An appeal from an 
interlocutory order is not one from a final judgment, even if by virtue of Cohen it is 
from a final decision. Interlocutory orders therefore may be stored up and raised at 
the end of the case. . . . This makes sense. The privilege to take an interlocutory 
appeal exists for the appellant’s protection. Such appeals come at great cost to the 
judicial system because they may prolong litigation and require appellate courts to 
cope with each case more than once. Most interlocutory appeals end in affirmance 
(thus entail wasted motion), . . . If the aggrieved party is content to swallow his 
losses and proceed with the case . . . no interest of either the judicial system or the 
adverse party is served by treating the whole subject as forfeit. That would simply 
induce public officials to file more interlocutory appeals. We therefore hold that a 
public official may raise questions of immunity on appeal from a final judgment, 
even though he bypassed an opportunity to take an interlocutory appeal.”) (citations 
omitted); McIntosh v. Weinberger, 810 F.2d 1411, 1431 n.7 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting 
that the interest in protecting public officials from monetary liability for official acts 
survives trial). 
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a party requests Rule 54(b) certification, to force immediate appeal 
for the purpose of reaching final resolution of a separable portion of 
a case.146
The Seventh Circuit briefly sought to protect the deadlines 
applicable to interlocutory appeals by holding the right to appeal 
prior to final judgment to be waived if a litigant failed to take 
advantage of the first opportunity to take an interlocutory appeal 
raising a particular issue,147 but it quickly backed off that position 
where the successive appeals were from different orders.148 And the 
Sixth Circuit has taken the position that a litigant waives the right to 
post-judgment appeal of an order for which an interlocutory appeal 
was available.149 But for all of the reasons presented in Section IV.A 
and other reasons, this is a distinctly minority view that “‘would lead 
to a blizzard of protective appeals[,] . . . lead to pointless 
forfeitures’” and “‘turn the policy against piecemeal appeals on its 
146. E.g., Ysais v. Richardson, 603 F.3d 1175, 1178-79 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(dismissing appeal as untimely in part, noting that appeal from an order that is 
certified under Rule 54(b) must be taken within thirty days of entry of the 
certification); Weinman v. Fid. Capital Appreciation Fund (In re Integra Realty 
Res., Inc.), 262 F.3d 1089, 1107 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[C]ertification of an order under 
Rule 54(b) ordinarily starts the clock running for purposes of filing notice of 
appeal.”). See generally 15A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 116, § 3905.1.
147. Fairley v. Fermaint, 471 F.3d 826, 827-28 (7th Cir.) (holding that the 
court lacked jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal of the denial of summary 
judgment when defendants did not appeal the denial of their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss based on qualified immunity and their motion for summary judgment was 
its functional equivalent, the court seeing this as an attempt to circumvent the time 
limits on the filing of an appeal), aff’d, 482 F.3d 897 (7th Cir. 2006). In his dissent, 
Judge Posner reasoned in part that a defendant who “strikes out in discovery” should 
not be “denied an appellate determination as to whether the case should have been 
dismissed.” Id. at 832 (Posner, J., dissenting).
148. Fairley v. Fermaint, 482 F.3d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[A] public 
official may appeal from an order conclusively denying a motion (based on qualified
immunity) seeking summary judgment, [regardless of whether] the official has 
appealed from an order denying a motion to dismiss the complaint, and [regardless 
of whether] the motion for summary judgment rests on new legal or factual 
arguments. But once a conclusive resolution has been reached at either stage, a 
renewed motion for the same relief, or a belated request for reconsideration, does 
not reopen the time for appeal.”).
149. Kennedy v. City of Cleveland, 797 F.2d 297, 300 (6th Cir. 1986) 
(holding that interlocutory appeals based on qualified immunity are waived if not 
taken immediately); cf. Sales v. Grant, 224 F.3d 293, 296-97 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(holding defendants’ claim of qualified immunity waived after they failed to press 
that claim until the case was remanded after a prior appeal). 
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head.’”150 Thus, on the occasions when interlocutory appeals of 
denials of summary judgment are permitted, those appeals should be 
permissive, rather than mandatory, as the federal intermediate 
appellate courts nearly unanimously hold. Interlocutory appeals 
impose so many undesirable effects that we should not go beyond 
authorizing them to seriously penalizing litigants who fail to take 
advantage of the opportunity. Sufficient incentives already exist for 
litigants, such as officials whose motions for summary judgment 
predicated on qualified immunity were denied, to immediately 
appeal those denials. 
Despite the inclination of lower federal courts to follow 
Supreme Court dicta,151 any dicta in Ortiz indicating that 
interlocutory appeals of summary judgment denials are mandatory 
are unworthy of being followed.
C. When Interlocutory Appeals of Summary Judgment Denials Are 
Not Available, or When They Are Available but Are Permissive 
and Not Taken, Should Their Post-Judgment (Sometimes Post-
Trial) Appeals Be Allowed?
The questions posed in this Section overlap with the questions 
addressed in Section IV.B, but I address them from different angles 
here. 
150. Ernst, 108 F.3d at 493 (quoting Exch. Nat’l Bank v. Daniels, 763 F.2d 
286, 290 (7th Cir. 1985)) (quoting Hunter v. Dep’t of Air Force Agency, 846 F.2d 
1314, 1316 (11th Cir. 1988)). 
151. United States v. Quinn, 728 F.3d 243, 256 (3d Cir. 2013) (opining that 
appellate courts that dismiss Supreme Court dicta “‘frustrate the evenhanded 
administration of justice’” (quoting McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re
McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 613 (3d Cir. 2000))); Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 725 
F.3d 197, 212 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (stating that lower courts generally must treat 
carefully considered dicta of the Supreme Court as authoritative); United States. v. 
Orona, 724 F.3d 1297, 1311 (10th Cir. 2013) (stating that the court was “‘bound by 
Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s outright holdings, 
particularly when the dicta [was] recent and not enfeebled by later statements’” 
(quoting United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1122 (10th Cir. 2007))); 
Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, 716 F.3d 1235, 1246 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating 
that considered dicta from the Supreme Court foreshadows what the Court may 
hold).
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1. The Allegedly Problematic Nature of Relying on a 
Law/Fact Distinction
In Chesapeake Paper Products Co. v. Stone & Webster 
Engineering Corp., the Fourth Circuit rejected post-trial, post-
judgment appeals of summary judgment denials for a number of 
related reasons.152 It found the position that a court should review 
such denials when the appellant asserted legal error but not when 
appellant asserted factual error to be “problematic because all 
summary judgment decisions are legal decisions in that they do not
rest on disputed facts.”153 But, while it is true that any grant of 
summary judgment is predicated on a conclusion that there are no 
genuine issues of material fact (as well as on the conclusion that the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law), it is not true that 
denials of summary judgment necessarily “do not rest on disputed 
facts”; indeed, many—probably most—denials of summary 
judgment are predicated on the court finding genuine issues of 
material fact, that is, issues on which reasonable finders of fact could 
disagree. While one can call that a “legal decision,” it reflects 
application of law (the summary judgment standard) to the facts 
before the court, and it rests precisely on the finding of disputed 
facts. So, the argument that the appealability of summary judgment 
denials should not rest on a law/fact distinction because “all 
summary judgment decisions are legal decisions in that they do not 
rest on disputed facts” is misleading, inaccurate, and unpersuasive.154
The Fourth Circuit also rejected the law/fact dichotomy based 
on the observation that it 
would require this Court to engage in the dubious undertaking of 
determining the bases on which summary judgment is denied and whether 
those bases are ‘legal’ or ‘factual.’ The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
do not require such a dichotomy in summary judgment denials, and we 
decline to . . . [oblige] district courts . . . to anticipate parties’ arguments 
on appeal by bifurcating the legal standards and factual conclusions 
supporting their decisions denying summary judgment.155
152. 51 F.3d 1229, 1235 (4th Cir. 1995). 
153. Id.
154. Id.; see also Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trs., 219 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(“‘[Q]uestion of law’ means an abstract legal issue rather than an issue of whether 
summary judgment should be granted.”). 
155. Chesapeake, 51 F.3d at 1235 (citations omitted) (citing Black v. J.I. 
Case Co., 22 F.3d 568, 571 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994)). 
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But things have changed. Since the 2010 amendments to Rule 56, the 
Federal Rules do instruct federal district courts to “state on the 
record the reasons for granting or denying the motion,”156 the Judicial 
Conference of the United States and the Supreme Court having 
decided that it is not too much to ask a district court to explain 
whether it is denying a summary judgment motion because it has 
found genuine issues of material fact or because it has concluded 
that, although the material facts are undisputed, the moving party is 
not entitled to judgment under the law. The district court need not 
anticipate the parties’ arguments on appeal to make clear the basis or 
bases for its decision. If a district court fails to adequately explain its 
analysis, the court of appeals can remand, directing the district court 
to provide appropriate analysis.157
In addition, the task of determining the bases on which 
summary judgment was denied and whether those bases are “legal” 
or “factual” is no longer “dubious,” if it ever was. Since at least the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. Jones, in 1995, courts of
appeals have had to decide whether a summary judgment denial was 
based on the court’s conclusion that genuine issues of material fact 
precluded summary judgment or on the court’s legal conclusions 
concerning whether, given the undisputed facts, defendant was 
immune from suit.158 Johnson required this determination because 
156. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The 2010 amendments were effective December 
1, 2010. The Advisory Committee Notes to the 2010 amendments add: 
Most courts recognize this practice. Among other advantages, a statement 
of reasons can facilitate an appeal or subsequent trial-court 
proceedings. . . . The form and detail of the statement of reasons are left to 
the court’s discretion. The statement on denying summary judgment need 
not address every available reason. But identification of central issues may 
help the parties to focus further proceedings.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note on 2010 amendments.
157. See, e.g., Robbins v. Becker, 715 F.3d 691, 694-95 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(remanding for district court to give more detailed consideration and explanation of 
its denial of defendant officers’ motion for summary judgment, based on qualified 
immunity). 
158. 515 U.S. 304, 319 (1995) (“When faced with an argument that the 
district court mistakenly identified clearly established law, the court of appeals can 
simply take, as given, the facts that the district court assumed when it denied 
summary judgment for that (purely legal) reason. Knowing that this is ‘extremely 
helpful to a reviewing court,’ district courts presumably will often state those facts. 
But, if they do not, [and] . . . a court of appeals [has] to undertake a cumbersome 
review of the record to determine what facts the district court, in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, likely assumed[,] . . . this circumstance does not 
make a critical difference to our result, for a rule that occasionally requires a 
detailed evidence-based review of the record is still . . . more manageable than the 
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the Supreme Court there held that only in the latter circumstance is 
an interlocutory appeal of the denial available under the collateral 
order doctrine.159 In fact, the Supreme Court in Johnson explicitly 
rejected the argument that the line that the Court was requiring courts 
of appeals to draw would be “unworkable” and overly difficult.160 In 
addition, courts of appeals routinely categorize issues as questions of 
fact, questions of law, or mixed questions of fact and law for 
purposes of determining the appropriate standard of review. Federal 
courts of appeals have had plenty of practice in making these “law” 
vs. “fact” distinctions,161 and the Fourth Circuit overstates the 
difficulty of making the distinction. For example, it had no difficulty 
at all in concluding in Chesapeake that although S & W portrayed its 
motion as having sought partial summary judgment on a discrete 
legal issue, its motion sought resolution of conflicting factual 
inferences, and denial of the motion rested on the trial court’s finding 
of genuine issues of material fact.162
The Fourth Circuit is correct that reviewing a denial of 
summary judgment after trial is inappropriate when the denial was 
based on the presence of disputed fact issues and that it is 
rule that . . . would make that task, not the exception, but the rule. We note, too, that 
our holding here has been the law in several Circuits for some time. Yet, petitioners 
have not pointed to concrete examples of the unmanageability they fear.” (quoting 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 n.6 (1987))). 
159. See supra note 26.
160. 515 U.S. at 318.
161. I should acknowledge that the analysis done to determine whether a 
court is dealing with a question of fact, a question of law, or a mixed question varies 
between the context of deciding the appropriate standard of review and the context 
of deciding reviewability. As noted in Jenike-Godshalk, supra note 29, at 1622, 
“While all [summary judgment] motions may be questions of law for purposes of 
determining the standard of review, only some of these motions are subject to the 
legal issue exception.” The difference is that, for standard of review purposes, an 
appellate court (arguably) is in as good a position as the trial court to determine 
whether there are genuine issues of material fact, based on a paper record, and is in 
as good or better a position to determine whether a party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law—thus, it makes sense for the court of appeals to review de novo—as it 
reviews questions of law—the district court’s ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment. But, in the context of deciding, post-trial and judgment, whether to review 
a summary judgment denial, the court of appeals has to determine something 
different, namely whether the denial of summary judgment was (or should have 
been) based on a finding of genuine issues of material fact or relied on a 
determination of law or an exercise of discretion. But the analysis is different 
because the focus is different, not because the nature of questions of law, questions 
of fact, and mixed questions changes. 
162. Chesapeake Paper Prods. Co. v. Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 51 F.3d 
1229, 1235 (4th Cir. 1995). 
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appropriate to view the factual base on which the motion was 
decided as superseded by the evidence adduced at trial.163 Further, I 
subscribe to the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that “‘[i]t makes no 
sense whatever to reverse a judgment on the verdict where the trial 
evidence was sufficient merely because at summary judgment it was 
not.’”164 However, I do not agree that “[r]eviewing the district court’s 
decision after a full trial is also problematic because in denying a 
summary judgment motion, the district court ‘does not settle or even 
tentatively decide anything about the merits of the claim’; its denial 
‘decides only one thing—that the case should go to trial.’”165 If a 
court denies summary judgment based on its view of the law—such 
as its interpretation of a statute or constitutional provision—rather 
than based on the existence of genuine issues of material fact, the 
district court does settle something about the merits of the claim; the 
denial does decide more than that the case should go to trial. Indeed, 
it is making law of the case, which the parties may be permitted to 
challenge in the district court only on limited grounds, and to which 
that court may well adhere.166 There are good reasons to permit post-
163. See Jimenez v. City of Chicago, 732 F.3d 710, 718 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(noting that trial supersedes the record at summary judgment). I also can agree that 
“a judgment after a full trial is superior to a pretrial decision because the factfinder’s 
verdict depends on credibility assessments that a pretrial paper record simply cannot 
allow,” Chesapeake, 51 F.3d at 1236, although I do not believe it is accurate to 
describe the pretrial record and the trial testimony as “identical” in that 
circumstance, even if the records are very similar.
164. Id. (quoting Black v. J.I. Case Co., 22 F.3d 568, 572 (5th Cir. 1994)). I 
do not agree with Professor Shannon that, in this circumstance, the fact that plaintiff 
won at trial is “somewhat beside the point” because the question is not which party 
ought to prevail but to determine whether, at the time the motion was filed or 
decided, there was a genuine issue of material fact that would warrant trial. Bradley 
Scott Shannon, Why Denials of Summary Judgment Should Be Appealable, 80 TENN.
L. REV. 45, 63 (2012). For the reasons given by a number of courts and other 
reasons offered by commentators who have criticized summary judgment, I see no 
reason to prefer a retroactive grant of summary judgment to the result of a full trial 
when the focus of each was the facts. Nor do I agree that there is so little meaningful
distinction between questions of law and questions of fact, id. at 64 n.76, that we 
should not differently treat denials of summary judgment based upon legal holdings 
than denials based on a finding of genuine issues of material fact, for purposes of 
appealability after trial and final judgment.   
165. Chesapeake, 51 F.3d at 1236 (quoting Switz. Cheese Ass’n v. E. 
Horne’s Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 25 (1966)). 
166. See, e.g., HK Sys., Inc. v. Eaton Corp., 553 F.3d 1086, 1089 (7th Cir. 
2009) (“The doctrine of law of the case counsels against a judge’s changing an 
earlier ruling that he made in the same case[.] . . . The doctrine . . . [has been] 
applied to a motion to reconsider a summary judgment ruling[.] . . . [I]n revisiting 
the issue of causation after the trial[, the judge] was not depriving HK of the benefit 
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trial, post-judgment review of a denial of summary judgment when 
the question posed is a question of law and the issue presented on 
appeal has not been mooted.167
Does it ever happen that an unmixed (a “pure”) legal issue was 
presented by the summary judgment motion? The answer is “yes.” 
When a court is, for example, interpreting a statute on the occasion 
of a motion for summary judgment, a pure legal issue is presented by 
the motion for summary judgment.168 Beyond such situations, the 
answer depends in part on how one defines a pure, as opposed to a 
mixed, question of law. Usage varies. For example, the Supreme 
Court has defined mixed questions as those “in which the historical 
facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and 
the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory [or 
constitutional] standard.”169 But Judge Schwarzer and others have 
countered that
[w]hen the facts material to the application of a pure rule of law are 
undisputed, the application is a matter of law for the court, requiring no 
trial [as in summary judgment]. . . . When the application of a rule of law 
depends on the resolution of disputed historical facts, however, it becomes 
a mixed question of law and fact.170
When courts decide or review decisions of motions for 
summary judgment, they sometimes say that the question posed is a 
pure question of law, and they sometimes say that the question posed 
is a mixed question of law and fact. But, when a party moves for 
summary judgment, however the courts characterize the question, 
they are answering whether the undisputed facts meet the relevant 
legal standard and therefore whether the moving party is entitled to 
of any of the evidence presented at the trial, because that evidence did not bear on 
the judge’s decision. He had denied summary judgment on the basis of his reading 
of the indemnification clause, and in reconsidering the denial after the trial he 
continued to treat the meaning of the clause as a pure issue of law, unrelated to 
anything that had gone on at the trial.”).
167. See infra text accompanying notes 176-80, 210, 219, 222-23, 231, 255-
61.
168. Courts held summary judgment motions to pose pure issues of law in 
the cases discussed supra text accompanying notes 43, 51-52, 55, and 58, and in 
notes 68-70, 79, 82, and 86.
169. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982).
170. WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER, ALAN HIRSCH & DAVID J. BARRANS, THE 
ANALYSIS AND DECISION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS: A MONOGRAPH ON 
RULE 56 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. 14-23, 
57-58 (1991), reprinted in 139 F.R.D. 441, 455-62, 487 (1992), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/rule56.pdf/$file/rule56.pdf.
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judgment as a matter of law.171 This question differs from whether 
there are genuine issues of material fact.
Next, recall the language of Switzerland Cheese Ass’n v. East 
Horne’s Market, Inc.—to the effect that the denial of a summary 
judgment motion settles nothing about the merits—emphasized by 
the Fourth Circuit in Chesapeake.172 Despite the Supreme Court 
origins of the internally quoted language, the language needs to be 
understood when seen without ellipses and in context. In Switzerland 
Cheese, the Court said that “the denial of a motion for a summary 
judgment because of unresolved issues of fact does not settle or even 
tentatively decide anything about the merits of the claim.”173 It was 
explaining why a denial of summary judgment to the plaintiffs, in a 
case in which plaintiffs moved for a permanent injunction—but not a 
preliminary injunction—was not immediately appealable under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), which permits the immediate appeal of denials 
of injunctions.174 The Court’s words and its position do not support 
the use to which the Fourth Circuit put them in Chesapeake. Indeed, 
a decision rejecting an interlocutory appeal of a denial of summary 
judgment may say little, if anything, about whether that same denial 
should be appealable after final judgment.
True, the same circumstance that renders a denial of summary 
judgment, sought on the basis of qualified immunity, not to be 
immediately appealable—that is, the denial’s grounding in the 
presence of genuine issues of material fact, rather than conclusions 
of law—also may appropriately render the denial of summary 
judgment non-appealable after final judgment. When the issue is 
allowance of an interlocutory appeal, the reasons for denying 
immediate appeal of a summary judgment denial based on genuine 
171. In litigation, many issues are mixed questions of law and fact. If the 
issue sought to be appealed post-judgment (in review of a summary judgment 
denial) really is a mixed question rather than a pure legal question, the resolution 
that was based on application of the law to the undisputed facts presented at the 
summary judgment stage may have been mooted by development of a fuller record 
at trial. However, when an unmixed legal issue was presented by the summary 
judgment motion or when the facts and law remain unchanged between the decision 
of the summary judgment motion and the decision by the trier of fact, the issue 
presented by the summary judgment motion has not been mooted, and the 
correctness of the decision of that issue should be addressed on appeal from the 
denial of the summary judgment motion, after final judgment.
172. See Chesapeake Paper Prods. Co. v. Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 51 
F.3d 1229, 1236 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Switz. Cheese Ass’n v. E. Horne’s Mkt., 
Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 25 (1966)).
173. 385 U.S. at 25 (emphasis added).
174. Id. at 23-25; 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2012).
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issues of material fact include delay, non-compliance with the 
collateral order doctrine, the greater experience of trial courts in 
dealing with the issue, the inordinate burden upon the appellate 
court, and the similarity of the issue to the merits issue that the court 
may later decide on a more complete record. When the issue is the 
post-judgment reviewability of a denial of summary judgment, the 
reasons for denying review of a summary judgment denial based on 
genuine issues of material fact include the possible mooting of the 
earlier issue and the greater unfairness of reversing a jury verdict 
than reversing a denial of summary judgment that was based on the 
judge’s belief that genuine issues of material fact precluded such a 
judgment on the pre-trial record. Conversely, one of the prerequisites 
for a denial of summary judgment being immediately appealable—
that is, its grounding in a determination of law separate from the 
conclusion that no genuine issues of material fact were 
presented175—also is a prerequisite for post-judgment appeal of the 
denial. In the former instance, the reasons lie in the relatively low 
burden on the appellate court and its presumed greater expertise 
(than the trial court) in deciding questions of law, in tandem with the 
other policies that allow an interlocutory appeal, given satisfaction of 
the collateral order doctrine or a statutory basis for immediate 
appeal. In the latter instance (of post-trial, post-judgment appeal), the 
relatively low burden on the appellate court and the court’s presumed 
greater expertise in deciding questions of law join with the policies 
that support the final judgment rule, including postponing appeal 
until district court processing of a case has been completed, to argue 
for post-judgment review of law-based summary judgment denials.
The most important points from this Section include the 
following. Courts are accustomed to distinguishing denials of 
summary judgment based on conclusions of law from denials based 
on findings of the existence of genuine issues of material fact, and 
the distinction is not so difficult to make that the difficulty should 
lead courts to refuse to review law-based summary judgment denials, 
after trial and final judgment. Summary judgment denials that are 
based on the trial court’s view of the law do settle something about 
175. There are other prerequisites under the collateral order doctrine. See 
supra note 26; Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 
(1994); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949). It is 
not every denial of summary judgment based on a legal determination that is 
immediately appealable. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995); Mitchell 
v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); Campos v. Van Ness, 711 F.3d 243, 245 (1st 
Cir. 2013).
946 Michigan State Law Review 2014:895
the merits of the case and create law of the case. Whatever subtleties 
there may be in characterizing issues as questions of law or mixed 
questions of law and fact, when an unmixed legal issue was 
presented by the summary judgment motion or when the facts and 
law remain unchanged between the decision of the summary 
judgment motion and the decision by the trier of fact, the issue 
presented by the summary judgment motion has not been mooted, 
and the correctness of the decision of that legal issue should be 
addressed, after final judgment, on appeal from the denial of the 
summary judgment motion. These are not situations in which the 
propriety of the summary judgment motion is a moot point because 
of subsequent development of the factual record at trial.
2. The Availability of Adequate Alternative Remedies
A number of circuits rationalized their refusal to entertain post-
trial, post-judgment appeals from denials of motions for summary 
judgment by asserting that the proper remedy for an erroneous denial 
of summary judgment was either interlocutory appeal or a Rule 50 
motion for judgment as a matter of law.176
The Fourth Circuit in Chesapeake said that the most important 
reason for refusing to differentiate summary judgment decisions 
based on decisions of law from those based on the determination that 
there exist genuine issues of material fact is that:
[A] party that believes the district court committed legal or factual error in 
denying summary judgment has adequate remedies other than seeking 
review of the denial after a full trial. First, a party may move for judgment 
176. See, e.g., Lind v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 254 F.3d 1281, 1285 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (opining that a party who believes the district court committed legal or 
factual error in denying summary judgment has adequate remedies in interlocutory 
appeal or a motion for judgment as a matter of law); Pahuta v. Massey-Ferguson, 
Inc., 170 F.3d 125, 132 (2d Cir. 1999) (observing that “[i]f a party wishes to appeal 
a denial of a motion for summary judgment, . . . the party may petition for the right 
to file an interlocutory appeal [under] 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); or . . . file [motions] 
pursuant to Rule 50 for judgment as a matter of law and appeal the district court’s 
denial of [those motions]”); Chesapeake, 51 F.3d at 1237 (same as Lind); Watson v. 
Amedco Steel, Inc., 29 F.3d 274, 279 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that when a motion for 
summary judgment has been denied, the movant should seek recourse through a 
Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law); Black v. J.I. Case Co., 22 F.3d 
568, 571-72 (5th Cir. 1994) (similar to Watson); Whalen v. Unit Rig, Inc., 974 F.2d 
1248, 1251 (10th Cir. 1992) (similar to Watson); Lum v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 
963 F.2d 1167, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that the appropriate way to 
obtain review of the denial of a summary judgment motion is through interlocutory 
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)).
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as a matter of law under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50 and then seek appellate review of 
the motions if they are denied. . . . [A] party may appropriately move for 
judgment as a matter of law on discrete legal issues . . . because a party 
may seek such judgments with respect to issues that are not wholly 
dispositive of a claim or defense. Reviewing a Rule 50 determination is 
preferable to reviewing a summary judgment decision because the Rule 50 
decision is based on the complete trial record and not the incomplete 
pretrial record available at summary judgment.
Second, a party that believes the district court committed error in denying 
summary judgment may move the court to certify the denial for 
interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) . . . although the 
district court may choose not to certify its decision for interlocutory appeal 
and the appellate court may choose not to consider the appeal.177
We first should ask whether and why it should matter that (or 
whether) a party who believes the district court committed legal or 
factual error in denying summary judgment has adequate remedies 
other than seeking review of the denial after a full trial. Discussion 
earlier in this Article already has established that interlocutory appeal 
of summary judgment denials is available primarily in the limited 
category of cases in which such denials are based on rejections of 
qualified or absolute immunity defenses.178 To the extent the position 
espoused by the Fourth Circuit in Chesapeake suggests that 
interlocutory appeal would be preferable, it turns on its head our 
system’s normal preference for post-judgment appeals. That would 
be undesirable.
In further response, the fact that a party who believes that the 
district court committed error in denying summary judgment may 
move the court to certify the denial for interlocutory appeal pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) is of little relevance. A party may refrain 
from seeking certification under § 1292(b) because it recognizes that 
the requirements of that statute are not satisfied.179 Indeed, federal 
courts have been notoriously grudging in authorizing appeals under 
§ 1292(b).180 More importantly, the requirements of § 1292(b) relate 
177. Chesapeake, 51 F.3d at 1236-37 (citation omitted). See generally
Morin, supra note 87, at 227 (arguing that if a party lacks a right to immediately 
appeal a denial of her summary judgment motion, she must “preserve summary 
judgment arguments through Rule 50 motions”).
178. See supra Part I.
179. See supra note 9.
180. Nat’l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 
2d 139, 161 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (“Over the past decade, there have been slightly more 
than 40,000 appeals heard by the court of appeals for the Second Circuit from final 
judgments. During that same period, only 138 interlocutory orders were certified 
under section 1292(b) for appeal, of which the court of appeals agreed to hear only 
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in large part to the propriety of an interlocutory appeal and not to the 
propriety of a later appeal. In any event, the effort to obtain a 
§ 1292(b) certification never has been mandatory. A party does not 
waive its right to appeal an alleged error after final judgment by 
virtue of having chosen not to seek § 1292(b) certification; there is 
no obligation to seek § 1292(b) certification and no penalty for not 
doing so.181 Thus, the ability to seek a § 1292(b) interlocutory appeal 
has little, if any, bearing on whether a party is or ought to be able to 
appeal, after trial and final judgment, what he alleges is a legally 
erroneous denial of summary judgment. 
The first point—that “a party [who] believes the district court 
committed legal or factual error in denying summary judgment . . . 
may move for judgment as a matter of law under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50 
and then seek appellate review of the motions if they are 
denied”182—needs closer examination. 
If the alleged error was in finding genuine issues of material 
fact, precluding summary judgment, I again agree that “that train has 
left the station,” and the Rule 50 motion, which is directed at the trial 
record, is the appropriate means to challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence. But if the alleged error in the denial of summary judgment 
is an error of law, why should a Rule 50 motion and appeal of its 
denial be the required grist for the appeal? 
To consider on what occasions or in what situations Rule 50 
motions should be required, it is useful first to ask:
93.”) (citation omitted). See generally Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing 
Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1193 
(1990) (noting that “commentators generally discount [§ 1292(b)’s] effectiveness as 
a safety valve for interlocutory appeals, since it has been historically utilized 
infrequently”); Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion: Discretionary 
Review of Interlocutory Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175, 266 (2001) (“District 
court certification is rare.”). The reasons include the widespread belief “‘that 
[§] 1292(b) is to be used sparingly, in exceptional [big] cases,’” district judges’ 
reluctance to invite reversal, and district judges’ very broad discretion to deny 
§ 1292(b) certification. See generally Mackenzie M. Horton, Comment, Mandamus, 
Stop in the Name of Discretion: The Judicial “Myth” of the District Court’s 
Absolute and Unreviewable Discretion in Section 1292(b) Certification, 64 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 976, 980-81 (2012) (quoting 15B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 7,
§ 3929). 
181. See In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litig., 741 F.3d 811, 817 (7th Cir. 
2014) (“An appeal from a final judgment encompasses review of earlier 
interlocutory rulings—even those that could have been the subject of an 
interlocutory appeal—so long as the issues decided in those rulings have not become 
moot.”); see supra note 144.
182. Chesapeake, 51 F.3d at 1236.
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a. How Do Summary Judgment Motions and Rule 50 
Motions Compare?
The Supreme Court has said that the standard for granting 
summary judgment is essentially the same as the standard for 
granting a Rule 50(a) motion.183 However, a summary judgment 
motion is made before trial and is based on the case record as it 
exists at the time the motion is made.184 The movant argues, based on 
that record, that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be 
decided and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. No “genuine” issue of material fact, in this context, means that 
there are no material issues as to which reasonable jurors could 
disagree.185 A Rule 50(a) motion is made, in a jury trial, when the 
party against whom judgment is sought has rested its case; the 
motion is based on the trial record to that point.186 The movant argues 
that “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient 
evidentiary basis to find for the [non-moving] party on [a particular] 
issue” and that the court should resolve that issue against the non-
moving party and grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law 
against the non-moving party because, under the law, an identified 
claim or defense cannot be maintained without a finding on that issue 
favorable to the non-moving party.187
183. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) 
(“[T]he standard for granting summary judgment ‘mirrors’ the standard for 
judgment as a matter of law, [so] that ‘the inquiry under each is the same.’” (quoting 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986))); Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (“[The] standard [for granting summary judgment] 
mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
50(a).” (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250)); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-53 (same). 
184. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
185. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 252 (a genuine issue of material fact exists 
if a reasonable jury could enter a verdict for the non-moving party); Gordon v. 
FedEx Freight, Inc., 674 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he nonmoving party 
must establish some genuine issue for trial such that a reasonable jury could return a 
verdict in her favor.”); Chapter 7 Tr. v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249, 1254 
(11th Cir. 2012) (“A genuine issue of material fact exists when ‘a reasonable jury 
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” (quoting Dixon v. Hallmark Cos., 
627 F.3d 849, 854 (11th Cir. 2010))).
186. In a non-jury trial, the most comparable rule is Rule 52(c), which 
provides in part that “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue during a nonjury 
trial and the court finds against the party on that issue, the court may enter judgment 
against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be 
maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.” FED. R. CIV. P.
52(c).
187. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a).
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Rule 50 thus focuses exclusively on the circumstances in which 
a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary 
basis to find for the non-moving party on one or more issues, and 
explicitly ties the conclusion that one party is entitled to judgment to 
the absence of sufficient evidence to allow victory for the other side. 
It corresponds to that portion of Rule 56 that focuses on whether 
genuine issues of material fact are posed.
Under Rule 56, once the court decides that genuine issues of 
material fact are not posed, the court must inquire whether the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.188 The latter 
question seems to be somewhat less tethered to the question whether 
there are genuine issues of material fact than is the judgment-as-a-
matter-of-law issue raised by a Rule 50 motion,189 though there is 
some disagreement about this, which is explored below.190
The potential difference between the two issues (of evidentiary 
sufficiency and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law) may be 
illuminated in this way: The summary judgment requirements of the 
absence of genuine issues of material fact and entitlement to 
judgment as a matter of law suggest that these are two separate 
phenomena. And the possibility that there could be no genuine issues 
of material fact and yet one could lose on the law bolsters the 
separateness of the two. 
However, one can get a judgment “as a matter of law” only 
when there are no genuine issues of material fact, so the absence of a 
genuine dispute as to a material fact is necessary but not sufficient 
for entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Thus, the state of the 
record inevitably comes into play when a party makes a summary 
judgment motion and also when a party makes a mid- or post-trial 
motion for judgment as a matter of law. The relevance of the record 
is among the reasons courts sometimes have said that a Rule 50 
motion has to be made, and its denial appealed, if a litigant wants the 
appeals court to reach the question whether judgment as a matter of 
law was wrongly denied to a litigant.191 However, when the question 
188. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
189. The Rule 56 inquiry seems to be more similar than the Rule 50 inquiry 
to the question posed by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. In the 12(b)(6) context, the court 
takes the factual allegations—though, under Twombly and Iqbal, not the 
conclusions—to be true, and asks whether the claimant has stated a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007).
190. See infra text accompanying notes 192-211.
191. See supra note 176.
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that would be posed after trial is no different from the question that 
was posed by the motion for summary judgment, it is not evident 
why a redundant motion should be necessary. Even more 
importantly, in some circumstances, the propriety of a Rule 50 
motion would be questionable, as explained below.192
b. Are Rule 50 Motions Appropriate for Questions Other 
than the Sufficiency of the Evidence?
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) states, in pertinent part: 
Judgment as a Matter of Law.
(1) In General. If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury 
trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally 
sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court 
may:
(A) resolve the issue against the party; and
(B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party
on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be 
maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.
(2) Motion. A motion for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any 
time before the case is submitted to the jury. The motion must specify the 
judgment sought and the law and facts that entitle the movant to the 
judgment.193
The primary, if not the sole, purpose of Rule 50 clearly is to 
authorize judgment as a matter of law when the evidence is 
insufficient to support a verdict for the party against whom the 
motion is made.194 Some courts and commentators have argued that 
192. See infra text accompanying notes 194-211.
193. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a).
194. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Judgment as a Matter of Law in a Jury 
Trial; Related Motion for a New Trial; Conditional Ruling, in 9 JAMES WM. MOORE,
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE (3d ed. 2014) § 50.05 (“Judgment as a matter of law is
appropriate when there is an absence of evidence on an issue or claim essential to a 
nonmoving party’s cause of action or defense or, if the movant bears the initial 
burden of production, the evidence in favor of the movant is so overwhelming that 
reasonable persons could not arrive at a contrary verdict.”) (footnotes and cross-
references omitted); id. § 50.06 (“[T]he[] fundamental purpose [of Rule 50 motions] 
is to determine whether . . . there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find 
for a nonmovant without the burden of production.”); id. § 50.60 (“[J]udgment as a 
matter of law is proper if there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a 
reasonable jury to find for the nonmovant under controlling law. . . . [J]udgment as a 
matter of law must be granted when, under governing law, there can be but one 
reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.”); 9B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
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the purpose of Rule 50 goes beyond this and that a Rule 50 motion 
properly may be the vehicle to seek and receive judgment as a matter 
of law based on purely legal issues that are unrelated to the 
sufficiency of evidence at trial.195
There is limited case law support for this proposition in actual 
holdings, however. In Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co., the 
Supreme Court said: 
There are . . . situations where the defendant’s grounds for setting 
aside the jury’s verdict raise questions of subject matter jurisdiction or 
dispositive issues of law which, if resolved in defendant’s favor, must 
necessarily terminate the litigation. The court of appeals may hold in an 
employer’s suit against a union, for example, that the case is within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, or in a libel 
suit, that the defendant was absolutely privileged to publish the disputed 
statement. In such situations, and others like them, there can be no reason 
whatsoever to prevent the court of appeals from ordering dismissal of the 
action or the entry of judgment for the defendant. 
On the other hand, where the court of appeals sets aside the jury’s 
verdict because the evidence was insufficient to send the case to the jury, 
it is not so clear that the litigation should be terminated.196
This was dicta.197 Lower courts generally take the position that they 
need to heed well-considered dicta of the Supreme Court,198 but one 
may question whether the Court’s indication that Rule 50 is the (or 
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2521 (Rule 50 “allows the court to 
remove from the jury’s consideration cases or issues when the facts are sufficiently 
clear that the law requires a particular result. . . . It is . . . a device to save the time 
and trouble involved in a lengthy jury determination when there is a clear 
insufficiency of evidence on one side of the case or the other. . . . [A] Rule 50(b) 
motion is merely a renewal of the preverdict motion . . . .”). 
195. See Redish, supra note 194, § 50.05 (“[W]hen appropriate, judgment as 
a matter of law may be granted on purely legal issues unrelated to the sufficiency of 
evidence at trial.”).
196. 386 U.S. 317, 327 (1967).
197. In Neely, the plaintiff had won a verdict that survived defendant’s 
motion for judgment n.o.v. Id. at 328. “J.n.o.v.” or judgment “n.o.v” is an 
abbreviation for judgment non obstante verdicto, that is, judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict. It was the post-judgment equivalent of a directed verdict. Both are now 
referred to by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as judgments as a matter of law. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a) advisory committee’s note (1991); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
847 (7th ed. 1999). In the court of appeals, the issue was the sufficiency of the 
evidence, not a discrete legal question, so the Supreme Court’s remarks were uttered 
in circumstances in which the Court had no reason to focus on the propriety of using 
Rule 50 to resolve legal questions separate from the sufficiency of the evidence. 
Neely, 386 U.S. at 328-29.
198. See supra text accompanying note 151.
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even an) appropriate vehicle for seeking reversal when dispositive 
issues of law could end a litigation was well-considered. 
Materials in the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 50 support
a narrower interpretation of the Rule. The 1991 Advisory Committee 
Notes state:
The revision authorizes the court to perform its duty to enter 
judgment as a matter of law at any time during the trial, as soon as it is 
apparent that either party is unable to carry a burden of proof that is 
essential to that party’s case.
. . . .
Paragraph (a)(2) retains the requirement that a motion for judgment 
be made prior to the close of the trial, subject to renewal after a jury 
verdict has been rendered. The purpose of this requirement is to assure the 
responding party an opportunity to cure any deficiency in that party’s 
proof that may have been overlooked until called to the party’s attention 
by a late motion for judgment.
. . . .
The second sentence of paragraph (a)(2) does impose a requirement 
that the moving party articulate the basis on which a judgment as a matter 
of law might be rendered. The articulation is necessary to achieve the 
purpose of the requirement that the motion be made before the case is
submitted to the jury, so that the responding party may seek to correct any 
overlooked deficiencies in the proof.
. . . .
In ruling on such a motion [a motion under Rule 50(b)], the court 
should disregard any jury determination for which there is no legally 
sufficient evidentiary basis enabling a reasonable jury to make it. The 
court may then decide such issues as a matter of law and enter judgment if 
all other material issues have been decided by the jury on the basis of 
legally sufficient evidence, or by the court as a matter of law.199
The comment that “[t]he revision of this subdivision aims to 
facilitate the exercise by the court of its responsibility to assure the 
fidelity of its judgment to the controlling law, a responsibility 
imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,”200
arguably suggests a broader mission for Rule 50. But the Advisory 
Committee Notes’ elaboration that 
[t]he expressed standard makes clear that action taken under the rule is a 
performance of the court’s duty to assure enforcement of the controlling 
law and is not an intrusion on any responsibility for factual 
199. FED. R. CIV. P. 50 advisory committee’s note (1991) (emphasis added).
200. Id.
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determinations conferred on the jury by the Seventh Amendment or any 
other provision of federal law201
suggests that the focus remains on entry of judgment as a matter of 
law only when such a judgment would not intrude on the jury’s 
prerogatives. The single invocation of responsibility to assure the 
fidelity of its judgment to the controlling law should not be taken to 
vastly expand the role of the courts under Rule 50.
The language in Rule 50(b) that when the judgment as a matter 
of law motion is not granted, the court submits the action to the jury 
“‘subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the 
motion’”202 is consistent with the narrow interpretation too, for if the 
legal questions raised by the motion go only to whether the evidence 
was sufficient to go to the jury—and the argument that the evidence 
was not sufficient is what is to be renewed after trial—then nothing 
in Rule 50(b) supports the proposition that a Rule 50 motion properly 
may be the vehicle to seek and receive judgment as a matter of law 
based on purely legal issues, unrelated to the sufficiency of evidence
at trial.
Nor would the issues that the Supreme Court in Neely
suggested could be handled under Rule 50 be unreachable under this 
plain-meaning interpretation of Rule 50. The parties or the court sua 
sponte could raise the objection of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction 
under Federal Rule 12 at any time.203 The affirmative defensive of 
privilege could not be raised for the first time after trial, but the bar 
to raising it would derive from a failure to raise it in a timely fashion. 
Affirmative defenses are supposed to be raised in the answer to the 
complaint204 and typically are waived if not timely asserted. If a 
defendant timely raised the affirmative defense of privilege and the 
trial court erroneously rejected it on a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings or a motion for summary judgment, that ruling should be 
appealable, after final judgment. But only if the disposition of the 
affirmative defense depended on the resolution of fact issues would a 
Rule 50 motion, directed at an unsupported adverse disposition of the 
privilege issue, be appropriate.
There is some broad language in the Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc. that may 
201. Id. (emphasis added).
202. See K & T Enters., Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 171, 175 (6th Cir. 
1996) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b)).
203. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
204. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
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appear to cut against my position. The Court there said that it had 
concluded that “‘[i]n the absence of . . . a [Rule 50(b)] motion’ an 
‘appellate court [is] without power to direct the District Court to 
enter judgment contrary to the one it had permitted to stand.’”205
However, the cases that the Court cited do not support this broad a 
position. In both of them, the focus was on the power of the court of 
appeals when no Rule 50(b) motion had been filed, and the issue was 
the sufficiency of the evidence.206 In the Court’s view, a post-verdict 
motion was necessary because “‘[d]etermination of whether a new 
trial should be granted or a judgment entered under Rule 50(b) calls 
for the judgment in the first instance of the judge who saw and heard 
the witnesses and has the feel of the case which no appellate printed 
transcript can impart.’”207 This reasoning is inapt when the focus is 
an alleged error of law that undergirded denial of a motion for 
summary judgment.208
205. 546 U.S. 394, 400-01 (2006) (quoting Cone v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper 
Co., 330 U.S. 212, 218 (1947)).
206. In Cone, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ order 
directing entry of judgment for respondent despite the fact that respondent had made 
no motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 330 U.S. at 217-18. The Court 
concluded that a party’s failure to file a Rule 50(b) motion deprived the appellate 
court of power to order the entry of judgment in favor of that party where there were 
issues concerning the sufficiency of the evidence. Id. at 214-15. Whether a new trial 
should have been granted or a judgment entered under Rule 50(b) called, in the first 
instance, for the judgment of the judge who saw and heard the witnesses; therefore, 
the case should have been remanded for a new trial. Id. at 216. 
207. Unitherm, 546 U.S. at 401 (quoting Cone, 330 U.S. at 216).
208. In a few of the intermediate appellate court cases cited for the propriety 
of using Rule 50 to decide legal issues separate from the sufficiency of the evidence, 
it may be that that conclusion was not mere dicta. But even those cases do not stand 
for the proposition that, on appeal from the final judgment, a party cannot rely on 
the denial of his motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., K & T Enters., Inc. v. 
Zurich Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that “where an appellant 
made a Rule 56 motion . . . that was denied, ma[de] those same arguments in a Rule 
50(a) motion at the close of the evidence that was also denied, lost in front of a jury, 
then renewed its arguments in a rejected Rule 50(b) motion after the entry of 
judgment, we will review only the denial of the Rule 50(b) motion”); accord
Chesapeake Paper Prods. Co. v. Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 51 F.3d 1229, 1236 
(4th Cir. 1995). But this is not to say that the appellant who made only a Rule 56 
motion (and not a Rule 50 motion) could not, after trial and judgment, appeal the 
denial of his summary judgment motion. Moreover, the Chesapeake and K & T
rationale for reviewing only the denial of the Rule 50(b) motion was that that 
decision was based on the complete trial record, rather than the incomplete record 
available at summary judgment. See Chesapeake, 51 F.3d at 1236; K & T Enters., 97 
F.3d at 174. But if the question posed is an abstract legal issue, not a mixed question 
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Under 28 U.S.C. § 2106:
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, 
modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a 
court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and 
direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require 
such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the 
circumstances.209
While this statutory power must be exercised consistently with 
the Federal Rules,210 it does not appear that anything in the Federal 
Rules precludes federal appellate courts from reversing a judgment 
and directing entry of summary judgment to a party who was 
erroneously denied it by virtue of an error of law by the district court 
judge who ruled on the summary judgment motion.
If the foregoing analysis is correct, Rule 50 motions are not 
appropriate for questions other than the sufficiency of the evidence. 
When summary judgment motions were denied, not on the basis of 
the existence of genuine issues of material fact but on the basis of 
holdings of law, Rule 50 motions cannot properly substitute for the 
summary judgment motions. In that circumstance, review of Rule 50 
motion denials should not be preferred to review of summary 
judgment motion denials.211 The review of a Rule 50 motion denial, 
that depends in part on the factual record, the completeness of the trial record should 
not matter. 
209. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2012).
210. Unitherm, 546 U.S. at 402. 
211. See Feld v. Feld, 688 F.3d 779, 782-83 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (rejecting the 
position that appellant had to make a Rule 50 motion in order to preserve for appeal
a purely legal question—“whether D.C. law permits a condominium owner to use 
force to exclude another from the building’s common areas”—that she raised in her 
unsuccessful motion for summary judgment, and upholding appellate jurisdiction 
over the issue); Wilson v. Union Pac. R.R., 56 F.3d 1226, 1229 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(“Where a motion for summary judgment based on an issue of law is denied, 
appellate review of the motion is proper even if the case proceeds to trial and the 
moving party fails to make a subsequent Rule 50 motion.”); cf. Chesapeake, 51 F.3d 
at 1235-36 (in dicta, requiring a Rule 50 motion to preserve a legal issue first raised 
in a motion for summary judgment, but the court was declining to review a denial of 
a motion for partial summary judgment that had been based on the existence of 
genuine issues of material fact); see also Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trs., 219 F.3d 674, 
675-77 (7th Cir. 2000) (“‘[Q]uestion of law’ as used in section 1292(b) has 
reference to a question of the meaning of a statutory or constitutional provision, 
regulation, or common law doctrine rather than to [the question] whether the party 
opposing summary judgment has raised a genuine issue of material fact. . . . We 
think [the framers of section 1292(b)] used ‘question of law’ . . . as referring to a 
‘pure’ question of law rather than merely to an issue that might be free from a 
factual contest. . . . ‘[Q]uestion of law’ means an abstract legal issue rather than an 
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like the Rule 50 motion itself, would focus on the sufficiency of the 
evidentiary basis to find for the non-moving party on one or more 
issues, rather than on the legal issue that is posed when there are no 
genuine issues of material fact. 
c.  Even If Rule 50 Motions Are Appropriate for Questions 
Other than the Sufficiency of the Evidence, Do Law-of-
the-Case Principles and Policies Argue Against Requiring 
Rule 50 Motions as a Prerequisite to Appeal?
Even if one rejects the preceding analysis and believes that 
Rule 50 motions have a function that is as encompassing as that of 
summary judgment motions,212 why should we require parties whose 
motions for summary judgment were denied to raise the same legal 
arguments via Rule 50 motions? What good reason is there to impose 
the procedural burden of requiring a party to raise again the same 
legal points that it made in its summary judgment motion?213
This Article already has adverted to both the general rule in the 
federal system that litigants do not need to repeat their legal 
arguments in varying guises and the possibility that revival of an 
issue through Rule 50 motions could be disdained under the law-of-
the-case doctrine or the policies that underlie that doctrine. I expand 
on those points here.
The better rule is that a litigant should not need to preserve 
legal arguments that it made in its motion for summary judgment by 
filing Rule 50 motions that reiterate the point. In general we do not 
require parties to repeatedly raise points that they have made, and 
that the court has ruled upon, earlier in a litigation.214 Indeed, we 
issue of whether summary judgment should be granted.” (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b) (2012))). 
212. Chesapeake, 51 F.3d at 1236 (“[A] party may appropriately move for 
judgment as a matter of law on discrete legal issues . . . because a party may seek 
such judgments with respect to issues that are not wholly dispositive of a claim or 
defense.”); see FED. R. CIV. P. 50 advisory committee’s note (1993).
213. Cf. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 14 (2002) (holding that Rule 23 
class members who have objected to a proposed settlement of the class action should 
not be burdened with the requirement that they formally intervene in the suit before 
they may appeal rulings rejecting their objections).
214. E.g., Sneed v. Shinseki, 737 F.3d 719, 724-25 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(stating that “preserving an argument for appeal . . . ‘requires that the lower court 
[have been] fairly put on notice [of] the substance of the issue’” (quoting Nelson v. 
Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 469 (2000))); Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
717 F.3d 224, 233-34 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that grant of a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim was preserved for appeal where plaintiff raised issues and 
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discourage parties from repeatedly raising the same legal issues. We 
do so, in part, through the doctrine of “law of the case.”215 In general, 
that doctrine precludes the re-litigation of issues within the context 
of a single case, once they have been decided.216 Although federal 
trial courts have unquestioned power to reconsider their earlier 
rulings, under this doctrine federal trial courts typically will not 
reconsider a prior ruling unless “controlling law has been 
changed[,] . . . relevant evidence is newly available,” reconsideration 
is “necessary to correct a clear error and to prevent manifest 
injustice,” or other exceptional circumstances are present.217 Thus, it 
would be inconsistent with the law-of-the-case doctrine to demand 
that litigants who lost on a legal point made in support of their 
arguments in opposition to the motion to dismiss that she now made on appeal); 
Sonoma Cnty. Ass’n of Retired Emps. v. Sonoma Cnty., 708 F.3d 1109, 1119 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (vacating dismissal of amended complaint, without leave to amend, 
holding in part that where the district court had rejected the association’s implied 
contract theory in its dismissal of the original complaint, the association’s failure to 
raise the same argument again in its amended complaint or after filing its amended 
complaint did not waive its right to argue on appeal the error of that rejection); 
Morton v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 498 F. App’x 835, 840 (10th Cir. 2012) 
(explaining that to preserve an issue for appeal, an insured was not required to renew 
his objection to the admission of statements in a deposition, where the district court 
already had definitely ruled on admissibility in ruling on a motion in limine). 
215. See HK Sys., Inc. v. Eaton Corp., 553 F.3d 1086, 1089 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(explaining that “[t]he doctrine of law of the case counsels against a judge’s 
changing an earlier ruling that he made in the same case”).
216. See, e.g., Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1250 (2011) (stating 
that a decision of law should govern in subsequent stages of a case); Cobell v. 
Salazar, 679 F.3d 909, 916-17 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“Under the law-of-the-case 
doctrine, ‘the same issue presented a second time in the same case in the same court
should lead to the same result.’” (quoting LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1393 
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc))); United States v. Watts, 934 F. Supp. 2d 451, 463 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that the law-of-the-case doctrine is driven by 
considerations of fairness, judicial economy, and the interest in finality (citing 
United States v. Carr, 557 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 2009))).
217. See generally Joan Steinman, Law of the Case: A Judicial Puzzle in 
Consolidated and Transferred Cases and in Multidistrict Litigation, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 595, 597-613 (1987); Allan D. Vestal, Law of the Case: Single-Suit 
Preclusion, 1967 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1-4 (1967). See, e.g., Benjamin v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Welfare, 701 F.3d 938, 949 (3d Cir. 2012) (applying the principle that “[w]hen a 
court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same 
issues in subsequent stages in the same case,” absent extraordinary circumstances); 
Winston v. Pearson, 683 F.3d 489, 498 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating that the court’s prior 
legal conclusions in the case were subject to challenge only if controlling authority 
had since made a contrary decision applicable to the issue, or other extraordinary 
circumstances were present). 
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motion for summary judgment raise that legal argument again in a 
Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law.218
If the factual basis to which principles of law have been applied 
has changed between the motion for summary judgment and the end 
of trial and if the question posed is a mixed question of law and fact, 
then the issue is not identical and the law-of-the-case doctrine will 
not apply. But if the material factual base to which principles of law 
have been applied has not changed or the case presents a pure 
question of law that remains unchanged, then the law-of-the-case 
doctrine should caution the court against revisiting its earlier 
decision; and holdings of law that undergird the denial of a summary 
judgment motion should be reviewable after final judgment, without 
a redundant Rule 50 motion being required.219
If some courts have been misguided in requiring a party who 
wanted to appeal the denial of his summary judgment motion to 
revive the underlying issue through a Rule 50 motion, perhaps the 
218. Some circuits hold that the law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply prior 
to final judgment, so that trial courts are freer to reconsider prior interlocutory 
rulings than the law-of-the-case doctrine indicates. See Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
647 F.3d 1247, 1251-52 (10th Cir. 2011), quoted with approval in Stewart v. Beach, 
701 F.3d 1322, 1328-29 (10th Cir. 2012) (declining to hold a second judge 
constrained by the law-of-the-case doctrine when he was asked to reconsider a prior 
judge’s denial of qualified immunity); cf. U.S. EEOC v. Global Horizons, Inc., 904 
F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1091-92 (D. Haw. 2012) (recognizing both the applicability of the 
law-of-the-case doctrine to interlocutory rulings, and the broad discretion to 
reconsider pre-trial rulings, and in this case changing its statute of limitations 
ruling). Even so, while we may permit parties to seek reconsideration of prior 
interlocutory orders, including denials of summary judgment, that is not to say that 
we do or should require parties to do so. Accord Shannon, supra note 164, at 55 
(“Though compliance with Rule 50 seems to have everything to do with the 
appealability of a verdict, it is not entirely clear—at least as a normative matter—
why this procedure has anything to do with the appealability of an earlier denial of 
summary judgment. The appealability of pretrial matters generally is not precluded 
by the failure to comply with Rule 50 . . . .”).
219. See EEOC v. Serv. Temps Inc., 679 F.3d 323, 331 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(“[T]he district court twice rejected [defendant’s] attempts to argue that the EEOC 
had not conciliated in good faith,” as a basis for denying summary judgment to 
defendant. The court so ruled on the ground that defendant’s answer to the 
complaint failed to raise the issue, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
9(c), because a failure to conciliate in good faith is a non-jurisdictional condition 
precedent, which must be pleaded with particularity in the answer. After an adverse 
final judgment after trial, defendant argued that the district court erred in requiring 
the lack of good faith conciliation efforts to have been raised in the answer, and in 
deeming the defense waived.). The Fifth Circuit addressed this legal issue, which 
stemmed from the summary judgment ruling. Id. There was no discussion of 
defendant’s need to have reprised the issue at trial by a Rule 50 motion or otherwise. 
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courts chose the wrong vehicle, but there is merit to their insistence 
on the aggrieved party doing something more than failing with its 
summary judgment motion. Some courts have argued that reviving 
the issue in some manner would help to avoid surprise to the 
appellee, could give the trial court an opportunity to revisit its earlier 
ruling, and therefore should be necessary to preserve the error for 
appeal. Let us examine these rationales.
3. Unfair Surprise 
What of the argument that if a would-be appellant does not 
have to file a Rule 50 motion or take some other action in the trial 
court, late in its proceedings, that revives the legal issue presented by 
the earlier denied summary judgment motion, raising that issue on 
appeal creates unfair surprise to the party who succeeded in having 
the summary judgment motion denied and allows the denial of 
summary judgment to act like a bomb, planted early, that can 
explode after jury trial and final judgment, blowing up and nullifying 
those proceedings?220
I don’t know why raising on appeal the legal rulings made in 
support of the denial of a motion for summary judgment should 
come as any more of a surprise to the prevailing party than raising on 
appeal any other adverse legal rulings that culminated in the adverse 
final judgment. Nor do I see any unfairness to the prevailing party in 
having to defend its judgment against contentions that a ruling on the 
law, on which the denial of summary judgment was predicated, was 
erroneous and harmed the losing party.221 Any prejudicial error in the 
proceedings below can nullify the judgment, whether that error was 
made in rulings on pleadings, rulings on discovery, or rulings at trial. 
Summary judgment denials are no more “bombs” that should 
be prohibited from sinking a judgment than are dismissals that 
“strike a vital blow to a substantial part” of complaints and require 
the plaintiff to resort to a legal theory on which it is more difficult to 
recover than the position taken in the initial complaint222 or discovery 
220. “Summary judgment was not intended to be a bomb planted within the 
litigation in its early stages and exploded on appeal.” Holley v. Northrop Worldwide 
Aircraft Servs., Inc., 835 F.2d 1375, 1377 (11th Cir. 1988). 
221. See Davis v. TXO Prod. Corp., 929 F.2d 1515, 1517 (10th Cir. 1991).
222. In at least the Tenth and Fifth Circuits, “while the pleader who amends 
or pleads over, waives his objections to the ruling of the court on indefiniteness, 
incompleteness or insufficiency, . . . he does not waive his exception to the ruling 
which strikes ‘a vital blow to a substantial part’ of his cause of action.” Id. (quoting 
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orders that deprive a litigant of discovery that could alter the 
outcome of the case or orders that reject proposed jury instructions or 
objections to contemplated jury instructions.
In all of these instances, our system permits appeal of the 
orders in question, notwithstanding that, in some of the instances, 
those orders were entered very early in the litigation.223 We do not 
require the litigants to repeatedly make the same points in order to 
preserve them for appeal. In the same way, our system seemingly 
should not require the litigant who unsuccessfully moved for 
summary judgment to make his same legal arguments in the district 
court in different garb, especially by way of Rule 50 motions for 
judgment as a matter of law, which this Article has shown to be 
inappropriate. 
The making of summary judgment motions and the writing of 
memoranda in support of and in opposition to such motions is a 
lengthy, onerous, and expensive process.224 The parties typically put 
a great deal of time and effort into advocating for and against 
summary judgment motions. Given this reality, it is not as though the 
legal points made in connection with a summary judgment motion 
“fly under the radar” and might bite an unsuspecting adversary after 
final judgment. Nor will the motion for summary judgment likely 
have been made and briefed so long before a case went to trial and 
judgment that opposing counsel will have forgotten about it. 
Decision of any motion for summary judgment that is filed 
unreasonably early is likely to have been postponed until the 
respondent on the motion had a reasonable opportunity to obtain 
affidavits and to take discovery to enable it to respond to the 
motion.225 I see no reason why a party who has made, and lost on, a 
Blazer v. Black, 196 F.2d 139, 143-44 (10th Cir. 1952)); Williams v. Wynne, 533 
F.3d 360, 365 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that “appellant did not waive his Title VII 
claim by filing an amended complaint that failed to replead the claim already 
rejected by the district court”). 
223. See Shannon, supra note 164, at 66 (“[I]t is unclear how a motion for 
summary judgment is more of a ‘bomb’ than any other appealable pretrial motion.”). 
If anything makes it a “bomb,” it is the uncertainty in the law as to whether and 
under what circumstances points made in summary judgment motions can be raised 
on appeal after final judgment, rather than anything inherent in such motions.
224. See supra note 4.
225. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d) (“If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or 
declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its 
opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow time 
to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other 
appropriate order.”).
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motion for summary judgment should be viewed as having “slept” 
on his rights by virtue of not reiterating his legal position at trial, nor 
why an opponent should be seen as having reasonably relied to his 
detriment on the moving party’s failure to reiterate at trial the legal 
position he took in his summary judgment motion.226 Thus, the unfair 
surprise and “bomb” arguments seem grossly exaggerated, if not 
fanciful. Nor is it obvious how any such surprise would be 
prejudicial. When the notice of appeal indicates that the appellant is 
appealing the denial of his motion for summary judgment, the 
appellee has ample means and opportunity to respond to that 
argument in his answer brief and on oral argument, if any.
Compare the federal courts’ handling of erroneous denials of 
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be 
granted. When summary judgment motions are denied on the 
grounds that a case presents issues of fact that are genuinely disputed 
and need to be tried, those decisions are superseded (mooted, 
overtaken, rendered irrelevant) by the evidence produced at trial, so 
as to make the relevant question after trial whether the evidence 
presented at trial was such that a reasonable fact finder could find for 
a particular party. We no longer care about the summary judgment 
record. Similarly, some motions for failure to state a claim on which 
relief can be granted are denied on the ground that the allegations are 
sufficient (they are sufficiently specific, sufficiently non-conclusory, 
or the like)—and, if the cases proceed to trial, those decisions on the 
pleadings are rendered unimportant first by the final pre-trial order 
that supersedes the pleadings227 and then by the evidence produced at 
trial, so as to make the relevant question after trial whether the trial 
evidence was such that the plaintiff proved a claim upon which relief 
could be granted. We no longer care about the complaint itself.228 In 
226. But see infra text accompanying notes 237-38 with respect to particular 
acts or omissions through which the party who lost on its summary judgment motion 
might waive or fail to preserve the error for appeal.
227. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(d) (providing in part that pretrial orders “control the 
course of the action,” unless modified). In support of the proposition that the final 
pretrial order supersedes the pleadings, see, for example, Case v. Abrams, 352 F.2d 
193, 195 (10th Cir. 1965); In-Sink-Erator Manufacturing. Co. v. Waste King Corp.,
346 F.2d 248, 251 (7th Cir. 1965); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 85 (3d Cir. 1965).
228. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(b)(2) (“A party may move—at any time, even after
judgment—to amend the pleadings to conform them to the evidence and to raise an 
unpleaded issue. But failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of that 
issue.”); see ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc. v. Biamp Sys., 653 F.3d 1163, 1171-74 (10th 
Cir. 2011) (refusing, after jury trial and final judgment, to review the pre-trial denial 
of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, and 
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that instance, courts typically do not permit the losing party to appeal 
on the ground that the trial court erred in denying the Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion; instead, the losing party must appeal on the ground that the 
evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. That’s what Rule 50 
is for. 
By contrast, other motions for failure to state a claim on which 
relief can be granted are denied on the ground that the governing law 
recognizes the cause of action that the claimant has pleaded (with 
sufficient specificity and concreteness). In that circumstance, if the 
case proceeds to trial and if the defending party loses at trial—the 
plaintiff having proved what she pled—may defendant appeal, 
arguing that the trial court erred in denying his Rule 12(b)(6) motion, 
or must he revive and recast his legal position by moving under Rule 
50 for judgment as a matter of law and then appealing the denial of 
that motion, if the district court denies it?
The answer is that denial of the motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim can be reviewed on the appeal following final 
judgment.229 The Wright & Miller treatise takes the position that 
announcing that appeal instead had to challenge the sufficiency of the claim through
a motion for judgment as a matter of law, where defendant’s motion for judgment as 
a matter of law asserted different arguments than defendant had made in its Rule 
12(b)(6) motion). The court found it unnecessary to decide whether to recognize an 
exception for post-trial appeals from denials of Rule 12(b)(6) motions that were 
based on the resolution of purely legal questions, observing that in the case at bar the 
denial was based largely on the district court’s conclusion that additional factual 
development was necessary before the court could confidently rule on whether 
plaintiff had a viable claim. ClearOne Commc’ns, 653 F.3d at 1172-73. The court 
relied on the Fifth Circuit for the propositions that, after trial, denial of a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion becomes moot; the sufficiency of the allegations is irrelevant, once 
parties have put on their proofs; and 
“[t]he arguments for not considering an appeal from a denial of a Rule 
12(b)(6) dismissal after a trial on the merits are stronger than those for not 
considering a refusal to dismiss under [Rule] 56, given the ease with 
which a plaintiff may amend a complaint after judgment . . . to conform to 
the evidence.” 
Id. at 1172 (quoting Bennett v. Pippin, 74 F.3d 578, 585 (5th Cir. 1996)).
229. See id. at 1172-73 (recognizing the possibility that a purely legal 
question could survive for review after trial, but refusing to review the sufficiency of 
the complaint after trial, because the case did not present such a question); United 
States v. Cambio Exacto, S.A., 166 F.3d 522, 529 (2d Cir. 1999) (after reversing a 
dismissal for lack of standing, the court refused to review the denial of a motion to 
dismiss for lack of probable cause to initiate a forfeiture and the denial of a motion 
for summary judgment, but it observed that there was no need for it to exercise 
pendant appellate jurisdiction and hear those issues on the interlocutory appeal 
because the appeal from the final judgment that was yet to come would permit 
review of those decisions); see also Fletcher v. Washington & Lee Univ., 706 F.2d 
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the question whether a complaint states a claim may be superseded by 
later events. Failure to plead adequately a claim that in fact is proved at 
trial should not warrant reversal. [But] . . . if the problem is not deficient 
pleading but reliance on [what defendant contends is] an erroneous legal 
theory[, while t]here is much to be said for requiring that the legal 
question be renewed at trial . . . if the [defendant’s] legal theory is rejected 
by a definitive ruling at the pleading stage, renewal should not be
required, not even if the defendant fails to request instructions embodying 
the rejected theory and to object to denial of the request.230
Summary judgment has similarly interrelated but distinct 
aspects that should provoke differing responses with respect to 
reviewability. One function is to provide an occasion for a court to 
determine whether there are fact issues that need to be tried. Another 
is to provide an occasion for a court to determine whether one of the 
parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When denial of a 
summary judgment motion is based on a finding that there are fact 
issues that need to be tried, that determination is not reviewable after 
475, 478 (4th Cir. 1983) (reviewing refusal to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
after reversing dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19). By the same 
token, grants of dismissals for failure to state a claim can be reviewed after final 
judgment. P. Stolz Family P’ship L.P. v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(permitting the plaintiff to appeal, after final judgment, the dismissal of one count of 
its first amended complaint, concluding that no valid purpose would be served by a 
formalistic requirement that the dismissed claim be repleaded in subsequent 
amended complaints to secure the right to review on appeal); Herdrich v. Pegram, 
154 F.3d 362, 367-68 (7th Cir. 1998) (permitting plaintiff to appeal, after final 
judgment, the grant of a motion to dismiss one count of the complaint, the rest 
proceeding to trial; noting that “an order which is not a final judgment when entered 
becomes final or appealable upon the entry of a final judgment[;] . . . appeal of this 
judgment renews all issues previously pleaded and resolved by the trial court”), 
rev’d on other grounds, 530 U.S. 211 (2000). 
230. 15A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 116, § 3905.1 (emphasis 
added). The language omitted from the quotation at the second ellipsis is “by 
argument, request for jury instructions, or a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence under the proper legal theory.” Id.; see id. § 3914.1 (“Denial of a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim often will be reviewable on appeal from a final 
judgment. But review may be denied if at trial adequate evidence is presented to 
support the judgment on a legally sufficient theory.”); see also Milton I. Shadur, 
Defenses and Objections: When and How Presented; Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings; Consolidating Motions; Waiving Defenses; Pretrial Hearing, in 2 JAMES 
WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE §12.34[6A] (3d ed. 2014) (“When a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is denied, . . . any appeal must await 
final judgment in the case.”). MOORE’S notes that the Fifth and Tenth Circuits “have 
held that after a plaintiff has prevailed at trial on a particular claim, the defendant 
may not raise on appeal the pretrial denial of the motion to dismiss on that claim.” 
Id. But, in those situations, the denial had become moot by virtue of the proofs. Id.
That would not be true in the situations that the text is discussing. 
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final judgment because, by then, the investment in trial has been 
made and cannot be undone, and it makes sense for the 
presumptively more complete trial record to take precedence over the 
presumptively less complete record that existed when the motion for 
summary judgment was considered. The situation fits the Supreme 
Court’s description of denials of summary judgment as not being 
conclusive of any claim.231 But, just as a denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion based on the court’s rejection of the legal theory on which 
the motion to dismiss was predicated should be appealable after trial 
and final judgment, a party who has lost on his summary judgment 
motion, based on a legal ruling rather than (or other than) on the 
existence of genuine issues of material fact, should be able to appeal 
the denial of his Rule 56 motion without having to revive and re-cast 
his legal position by moving under Rule 50 for judgment as a matter 
of law (or otherwise) and then appealing the denial of that motion. 
What of the notion that the trial judge should be given an 
opportunity to reconsider and that we therefore should require 
additional litigant action to preserve the alleged error?
4. Should We Require Trial Judges to Be Given an 
Opportunity to Reconsider Their Summary Judgment 
Denials, and, to That End, Require Additional Litigant 
Action to Preserve the Alleged Error?
It has been proposed that, in fairness to the district court judge, 
the party whose summary judgment motion was denied should have 
to re-raise the legal issue at trial, as a prerequisite to being able to 
appeal the summary judgment denial on the appeal from final 
judgment.232 But why? We do not normally require a party to file a 
motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appealing from a prior 
adverse ruling. If there is a reason to impose this burden on potential 
appellants with respect to summary judgment denials but not on 
losers on other issues, I have not seen it articulated.
Although parties have to properly preserve alleged errors in 
order to raise them on appeal, when a court rules against a party who 
has made a motion, the alleged error in the ruling on the motion 
231. Switz. Cheese Ass’n v. E. Horne’s Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 25 (1966); 
see also Elam v. Kan. City S. Ry., 465 F. App’x 369, 370 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting 
that the district court’s denial of summary judgment to defendant was “not 
conclusive of any claim” and that the railroad’s defenses could be addressed in the 
trial court). 
232. See Jenike-Godshalk, supra note 29, at 1618-19 & n.124. 
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normally is regarded as properly preserved.233 A number of courts 
have held in particular that an issue raised in a motion for summary 
judgment but not reasserted in a motion for directed verdict 
nevertheless is preserved for consideration on appeal.234
233. FED. R. CIV. P. 46 (“A formal exception to a ruling or order is 
unnecessary. When the ruling or order is requested or made, a party need only state 
the action that it wants the court to take or objects to, along with the grounds for the 
request or objection.”); see, e.g., E. Mountain Platform Tennis, Inc. v. Sherwin-
Williams Co., 40 F.3d 492, 497 (1st Cir. 1994) (declaring that “all rulings of law 
subsumed within [Rule 50 motions] are subject to review on appeal from the 
judgment”); Imperial Ins., Inc. v. Emp’rs Liab. Assurance Corp., 442 F.2d 1197, 
1201 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (discussing an action on an employee’s fidelity policy where 
the insurer failed to object to a jury instruction regarding waiver of time specified in 
the policy for proof of loss and holding that the insurer adequately preserved for 
review its position on waiver, since at an early stage of the proceedings there had 
been a “full exchange between court and counsel at which [the insurer’s] position 
had been rejected”); United States v. Barndollar & Crosbie, Inc., 166 F.2d 793, 796 
(10th Cir. 1948) (acknowledging that the taking of formal exceptions to rulings or 
orders of the court is unnecessary and holding that “to preserve a question for review 
on appeal, a litigant [must] make known to the court the action he desires taken, or 
his objection to the action taken and his . . . grounds therefor”). 
234. Paschal v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 295 F.3d 565, 572 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that appellant, which raised a statute of limitations defense in its summary 
judgment motion but failed to raise the issue when it moved for judgment as a 
matter of law after the jury rendered its verdict, did not waive appellate review of 
the rejection of the statute of limitations defense, as the legal issue raised in 
appellant’s motion for summary judgment did not require the resolution of any 
disputed facts); Bottineau Farmers Elevator v. Woodward-Clyde Consultants, 963 
F.2d 1064, 1073 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that “WCC raised the constitutional issue 
[concerning tolling of the statute of limitations] in its motion for summary judgment 
and did not have to specifically reassert the constitutional issue in its subsequent 
motions for directed verdict or for JNOV in order to preserve that issue for 
consideration on appeal”); Grubb v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 1151, 1160 (10th Cir. 1989) 
(reasoning that an issue raised in a motion for summary judgment but not in a 
motion for directed verdict was properly before the court on appeal; having attacked 
plaintiff’s standing in a summary judgment motion, “First National [did] not waive 
that issue by its later defense to the underlying merits,” and where “the question of 
standing under Rule 10b-5 rest[ed] on undisputed facts and thus present[ed] a legal 
question addressed to the court rather than the jury,” Rule 50(b) did not prevent the 
FDIC from raising the purely legal issue on appeal); Scola v. Boat Frances R., Inc., 
546 F.2d 459, 460 (1st Cir. 1976) (holding where the issue whether a judgment was 
binding under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution had been raised in 
a summary judgment motion, and defendant did object to the denial of its motion, 
the court held that, if this motion should have been granted, “defendant did not, after 
its denial, lose its rights by defending itself on the merits”; it did not need to move 
for a directed verdict and judgment n.o.v. or object to the charge to the jury to 
preserve the point for appeal).
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As we have seen, the courts that imposed a duty on would-be 
appellants to do something, subsequent to the summary judgment 
denial, to preserve for appeal the error of that ruling typically have 
required the future appellant to file a Rule 50 motion.235 This Article 
has argued that Rule 50 is ill-fit for the task when summary 
judgment was denied based on the trial court’s holding as to the law 
and that it has been erroneous for courts to make the filing of a Rule 
50 motion, reiterating appellant’s legal argument, a prerequisite to 
appeal of the alleged legal error. But (at least in part) because courts 
chose this device, they have not given much thought to alternative 
ways in which the legal error in summary judgment denials might be 
preserved or to whether any further step at all should be required. 
Requiring a motion for reconsideration would be aberrant.236
Requiring a motion for a new trial would make no sense because the 
appellant does not want a new trial; he wants to be held entitled to 
win as a matter of law. 
It seems to me that, in some circumstances, a consistent failure 
to object to the admission of evidence that would be irrelevant on the 
appellant’s theory of the case, as marshaled in its summary judgment 
motion and memoranda in support, might support a holding that the 
appellant had waived or not “preserved” the error. A failure to offer 
evidence in support of the summary judgment movant’s theory of the 
case also could be damaging.237 Similarly, a failure to object to jury 
235. E.g., Norton v. Ga. Pac. Corp., No. 93-2019, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 
10891, at *2 (8th Cir. filed May 18, 1994) (holding that Norton did not preserve for 
appeal the alleged error in denying its motion for summary judgment because it did 
not move for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial).
236. But making such a motion sometimes may be a good idea. See HK Sys., 
Inc. v. Eaton Corp., 553 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (7th Cir. 2009). A party having moved 
for reconsideration of its motion for summary judgment, which the district court 
initially denied, and the district court then having granted the motion on 
reconsideration, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, approving the exercise of discretion to 
reconsider the summary judgment denial and, reaching the merits, noting that: 
the justification for refusing [to hear an appeal from the denial of a 
summary judgment motion] fails when the motion is denied because of a 
ruling on a pure question of law rather than on the adequacy of the 
evidence presented in opposition to the motion. For then if the ruling was 
erroneous and the motion should have been granted regardless of the 
evidence, the trial is an irrelevance. And that is this case.
Id. at 1089 (citation omitted).
237. See Gomez v. MasTec N. Am., Inc., 284 F. App’x 517, 519 (9th Cir. 
2008) (“MasTec assert[ed that] the district court erred in denying its motion for 
summary judgment on the ground that Gomez’s claim . . . was barred by the Statute 
of Frauds. Because MasTec did not introduce facts on this issue at trial, MasTec 
waived the issue.”). 
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instructions that were inconsistent with the theory of the summary 
judgment motion and memoranda in support or a failure to propose 
jury instructions that were consistent with and would apply the 
theory of the summary judgment motion and supporting memoranda 
might warrant a holding that the appellant had waived or not 
“preserved” the error.238 On the other hand, such litigant conduct 
could be held unnecessary in light of earlier rejection of appellants’ 
legal theory. At a minimum, appellate courts should not bar appeals 
from law-based summary judgment denials on such grounds as these 
until the appeals courts have given litigants advance warning of the 
acts and omissions that may constitute waiver or failure to 
preserve—so that such appellants do not become the ones with just 
complaints of “unfair surprise.” As of now, little law indicates what, 
if anything (other than making a Rule 50 motion), a litigant must do 
to preserve for appeal the allegedly erroneous denial of law-based 
summary judgment denials. 
Why else have courts refused to allow post-trial, post-judgment 
review of motions for summary judgment?
5. Is the “Interlocutory” Nature of Such Denials Any Reason 
to Deny Post-Judgment Appeal?
Ortiz recited that an order denying summary judgment “retains 
its interlocutory character as simply a step along the route to final 
judgment.”239 The fact that denials of summary judgments are 
“interlocutory” merely suggests why they ordinarily are not 
immediately appealable. The Court seemed to suggest that 
interlocutory orders remain unreviewable after final judgment.240 But 
238. See, e.g., Trs. of Ind. Univ. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 920 F.2d 429, 433 
& n.5 (7th Cir. 1990) (explaining that “the district court’s refusal to rule on the 
applicability of [a] warranty as a matter of law, because it substantially affected the 
issues that were tried and upon which judgment was entered, was an interlocutory 
decision that can be challenged in this appeal from the final judgment”; noting that 
“nowhere in its challenges to several of the . . . jury instructions [did] I.U. establish 
that it preserved [the] issues [raised by its summary judgment motion] by objecting 
to the [jury] instructions when they were proposed or by proffering an alternate 
version,” but that Aetna failed to raise any such waiver, and so waived that 
objection), abrogated by Watson v. Amedco Steel, Inc., 29 F.3d 274, 278 (7th Cir. 
1994).
239. Ortiz v. Jordan, 131 S. Ct. 884, 889 (2011). 
240. It is ironic that the Court, in its broad dicta in Ortiz, manifested hostility 
toward post-trial, post-judgment appellate review of legal issues posed by summary 
judgment motions when the Court has afforded the intermediate federal courts of 
appeals great latitude to address, after judgment, legal issues that were not raised in 
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that is contrary to the general principle that, after final judgment, 
interlocutory orders that merge in the judgment do become 
appealable.241 “[U]nder the merger rule, prior interlocutory orders . . . 
‘merge with the final judgment in a case, and the interlocutory orders 
(to the extent that they affect the final judgment) may be reviewed on 
appeal from the final order,’”242 so long as the appellant did not lead 
the court into the alleged error and the issue has not become moot. 
The view that denial of a motion for summary judgment is not 
appealable after final judgment appears to be based on the 
assumption that a denial of summary judgment is not merged in the 
final judgment.243 But, to the degree the ruling on the motion decides 
issues of law that go to the merits, that ruling should be regarded as 
merged in the judgment. Rulings on issues of law manifested in the 
grant or denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on 
which relief can be granted and legal rulings inherent in the grant or 
denial of a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law are 
regarded as merged in the judgment.244 There is no reason rulings on 
the trial court at all and were raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Hormel v. 
Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941) (“There may always be exceptional cases or 
particular circumstances which will prompt a reviewing or appellate court, where 
injustice might otherwise result, to consider questions of law which were neither 
pressed nor passed upon by the court . . . below.”). See generally Joan Steinman,
Appellate Courts as First Responders: The Constitutionality and Propriety of 
Appellate Courts’ Resolving Issues in the First Instance, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1521, 1549-57 (2012).
241. See supra text accompanying note 5 (regarding the distinction between 
reviewable and appealable).
242. Cycle Chem, Inc. v. Jackson, 465 F. App’x 104, 107 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2008)); Munoz v. 
Small Bus. Admin., 644 F.2d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that an “appeal 
from the final judgment draws in question all earlier non-final orders and all rulings 
which produced the judgment”), quoted in Pittman v. Avish P’ship, 525 F. App’x 
591, 592 (9th Cir. 2013).
243. See Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 
706, 716 (5th Cir. 1968).
244. See, e.g., United Fire & Casualty Co. v. Titan Contractors Serv., Inc., 
(8th Cir. 2014) (reasoning that because the denial of summary judgment merges into 
the final order granting summary judgment to a different party, a court may review 
both orders and, if appropriate, direct the entry of summary judgment in favor of the 
appellant); Stilwell v. Am. Gen. Life. Ins. Co., 555 F.3d 572, 576 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that upon grant of a motion for summary judgment, denial of a cross-
motion may be appealed because it is merged in the final judgment); Pub. Citizen v. 
U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (reviewing denial of 
summary judgment where order disposed of all issues before the district court); 
Jarrett v. Epperly, 896 F.2d 1013, 1016 n.1 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[D]ecisions in this 
circuit generally state that interlocutory orders merge into the final judgment and 
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issues of law that are manifested in the (grant or) denial of motions 
for summary judgment should not also be so regarded, and many 
cases say that they are merged.245 Although other cases take the 
contrary view,246 it is not clear why they do so. The notion may have 
derived from situations in which the summary judgment denial was 
based on the existence of genuine issues of material facts and in 
which the denial therefore was mooted by the subsequent trial. Later 
courts may have unthinkingly parroted the non-merger language in 
situations in which it was inapt. 
Insofar as the ruling on a motion for summary judgment 
decides only that genuine issues of material fact need to be tried, it 
does not matter whether it is regarded as merged in the judgment; for 
may be presented on appeal of that final judgment.”); Grubb v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 
1151, 1160 (10th Cir. 1989) (“This appeal from the judgment . . . permits First 
National . . . to challenge all prior nonfinal orders, including the order denying 
summary judgment . . . .”); Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 157 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(reversing denial of summary judgment to plaintiff and grant of summary judgment 
to defendant, as all claims had been disposed of); Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, 392 
F.2d at 716 (reversing denial of summary judgment where there was no material 
issue of fact and plaintiff was entitled to judgment under the law). See generally
Stempel & Gensler, supra note 136, § 56.130[3][c] (discussing post-verdict review 
of summary judgments, and circuits’ differing positions); see also 10A WRIGHT,
MILLER & KANE, supra note 15, § 2715 (“[T]he denial of a Rule 56 motion is an 
interlocutory order from which no appeal is available until the entry of judgment 
following the trial on the merits. At that time, the party who unsuccessfully sought
summary judgment may argue that the trial court’s denial of the Rule 56 motion was 
erroneous.”); 15A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 116, § 3914.10 (“If no 
appeal is taken from the first order that might be appealed, the same immunity 
issue . . . is subject to review on appeal from the final judgment.”). 
A number of cases do recite that an order denying summary judgment 
typically does not merge into the final judgment. E.g., Rivera-Torres v. Ortiz Velez, 
341 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 2003) (“‘[A]n order denying summary judgment typically 
does not merge into the final judgment and therefore is not an independently 
appealable event if the case thereafter proceeds to trial.’” (quoting Iacobucci v. 
Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 22 (1st Cir. 1999))); Glaros v. H.H. Robertson Co., 797 F.2d 
1564, 1573 & n.14 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (indicating that when a denial of summary 
judgment “decided nothing but a need for trial and trial has occurred, the general 
and better view is against review of summary judgment denials on appeal from a 
final judgment entered after trial”). However, the cases rarely, if ever, defend the 
proposition that a summary judgment denial typically does not merge into the final 
judgment. The notion may have its source in—and should be limited to—situations 
in which the denial was based upon the trial court’s conclusion that genuine issues 
of material fact needed to be tried. In those situations, it makes sense to regard the 
ruling on the motion to have been overtaken by subsequent events, and for 
insufficiency of the evidence to be tested by Rule 50 motions. 
245. See supra notes 11, 22, 244.
246. See supra note 244.
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other reasons, those rulings should not be appealable after trial. Once 
evidence is presented at trial, any challenge made to the sufficiency 
of the evidence when a motion for summary judgment was filed is 
moot; that question is overtaken (mooted) by the trial. The accuracy 
of the prediction as to whether the “evidence [at trial] will be 
sufficient to support a verdict in favor of the nonmov[ing party]”247
(or, if one does not like that formulation, the determination that 
genuine issues of material fact were presented)248 becomes irrelevant 
because “the full record developed in court supersedes the record 
existing at the time of the summary judgment motion.”249 These are 
the reasons why denials of summary judgment based on the 
existence of genuine issues of material fact should not be appealable 
after trial.
An order denying partial or complete summary judgment based 
on a holding of law—other than a conclusion that summary 
judgment should be denied because of genuine issues of material 
fact—should be appealable after final judgment, unless the order has 
become moot250 or some procedural prerequisite to appealing the 
order has not been satisfied. If the summary judgment denial was 
previously appealable, the question would arise whether failure to 
raise the issue on an earlier appeal waived the right to appeal. But 
that question has been answered negatively.251 Moreover, the notice 
of appeal from the final judgment should bring up the summary 
judgment denial for review. Because appeal from the denial of 
summary judgment will be timely so long as the appeal from the 
247. Stempel & Gensler, supra note 136, § 56.130[3][c][i].
248. Shannon, supra note 164, at 64-65 (“[D]enial of a motion for summary 
judgment, though, is not supposed to be based on a prediction that the evidence at 
trial will be sufficient to support a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Rather, it 
is supposed to be a determination, based on the record at summary judgment, that 
there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact.”). 
249. Ortiz v. Jordan, 131 S. Ct. 884, 889 (2011); see also Feld v. Feld, 688 
F.3d 779, 782 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Stempel & Gensler, supra note 136,
§ 56.130[3][c][i] (“Once the trial has taken place, the focus of the court of appeals is 
appropriately on the evidence actually admitted, not on the earlier summary 
judgment record.”). 
250. As previously explained, trial—in and of itself—will not have mooted 
the legal issue.
251. Habitat Educ. Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 607 F.3d 453, 456 (7th Cir. 
2010) (“Even when an interlocutory order is immediately appealable, the party 
adversely affected . . . can wait and challenge it later, on appeal from the final 
judgment, provided . . . that the order hasn’t become moot . . . .”), adhered to in In re 
Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litig., 741 F.3d 811 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing 15A WRIGHT,
MILLER & COOPER, supra note 116, § 3911). 
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final judgment is timely, there will be no need for any tolling of the 
time to appeal to have occurred under Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 4(a)(4)(A) and (B),252 notwithstanding the Supreme 
Court’s indication in Ortiz that the time to appeal the summary 
judgment denial in that case had long since run.253
6. Is the Goal of Avoiding Greater Injustice Thwarted by 
Permitting Post-Judgment Appeals? 
Proponents of the view that denials of summary judgment 
should not be appealable after final judgment often have reasoned 
that a full trial on the merits ordinarily should lead to a more just 
result and that permitting review of the denial of summary judgment 
could lead to the absurd result that one who has sustained his 
position after trial nevertheless might be denied his judgment on 
appeal. “‘To deny review seems to be unjust. But to grant it . . . [and 
reverse] would be [more] unjust to the party that was victorious . . . 
after the evidence was more completely presented,’” where witnesses 
were cross-examined and the trier of fact could assess live witnesses’ 
credibility.254
In some circumstances, this argument is very compelling. It 
provides persuasive reasons for courts of appeals not to review 
denials of summary judgment that were predicated on the existence 
of genuine issues of material facts.255 It is not at all compelling, 
however, when the denial of summary judgment was based on a 
holding and application of the law to undisputed facts that match, in 
all material respects, those presented at trial. In that instance, there is 
no reason to believe that the trial on the merits led to a more just 
result, and permitting review of the denial of summary judgment 
252. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(A)-(B) (providing that if a party timely files, in 
the district court, any of a number of listed motions, the time to file an appeal runs 
from the entry of the order disposing of the last such motion).
253. See Ortiz, 131 S. Ct. at 894.
254. Morgan v. Am. Univ., 534 A.2d 323, 326 (D.C. 1987) (quoting Evans 
v. Jensen, 655 P.2d 454, 458 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982)), cited in Jianbin Wei, 
Reviewability of Denial of Motions for Summary Judgment on Appeal from Final 
Judgment, 52 J. MO. B. 20, 22 & nn.32, 35 (1996); see also Locricchio v. Legal 
Servs. Corp., 833 F.2d 1352, 1359 (9th Cir. 1987). 
255. I have conceded that if the evidence at trial establishes materially 
different facts than those upon which the determination of law was made at the 
summary judgment stage and if the determination at summary judgment was of a 
mixed question of law and fact, then the denial of summary judgment should be 
regarded as mooted and review of the denial should be refused. 
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would not lead to an absurd result even if he who sustained his 
position at trial were denied his judgment on appeal. To grant review 
to the summary judgment denial and to reverse the judgment would 
not be unjust to the party that was victorious after all the evidence 
was in, for the appellate court would be deciding that, under the law, 
the prevailing party below was not entitled to win; indeed, if the 
court were to reverse, it would be deciding that his adversary had 
been entitled to win, as a matter of law, on his motion for summary 
judgment.256 Thus, summary judgment denials based on errors of law 
should be appealable after final judgment, in the interest of justice.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides in part that 
“[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”257 Denial of post-judgment 
review to pre-trial denials of summary judgment “would inhibit 
effective and consistent appellate court scrutiny of trial court 
compliance with pre-trial procedure.”258 Even acknowledging district 
courts’ discretion to deny summary judgment in some 
circumstances,259 it remains true that if erroneous denials were not 
subject to appellate review, effective appellate court scrutiny of trial 
courts’ compliance with their duties under Rule 56 would be greatly 
inhibited.260 As a result, prevailing parties would receive the benefit 
of rulings that may have been wrong.261
It also should be noted the reasoning that relies on doing 
greater justice262 should have no influence at all when a judgment 
256. As stated by Wei, supra note 254, at 23, “[a] party’s entitlement to a 
jury trial and ultimately to a favorable jury verdict . . . depends on his making a 
triable case at the stage of motion for summary judgment.”
257. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (emphasis added). 
258. Balson v. Dodds, 405 N.E.2d 293, 295 (Ohio 1980), quoted in Wei, 
supra note 254, at 22; accord Chemetall GMBH v. ZR Energy, Inc., 320 F.3d 714, 
720 (7th Cir. 2003) (explicitly excusing the failure to move for JMOL and, post-trial 
and judgment, reviewing the challenge to a summary judgment denial that was 
based on a purported legal error); Ruyle v. Cont’l Oil Co., 44 F.3d 837, 841 (10th 
Cir. 1994) (same). 
259. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) 
(observing that courts may deny summary judgment when they have reason to 
believe that the better course would be to proceed to trial); Kennedy v. Silas Mason 
Co., 334 U.S. 249, 257 (1948) (vacating the lower court’s entry of summary 
judgment despite acknowledgment that the district court may have been justified in 
granting summary judgment).
260. See Wei, supra note 254, at 22.
261. See id. at 23.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 63, 71, 81.
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should be reversed on other grounds, such as reversal based on errors 
that are independent of the ruling on the summary judgment motion. 
Review of the summary judgment denial then might prevent a re-
trial.
7. Is Fear of Wasted Trials an Adequate Reason to Reject 
Post-Judgment Review of Summary Judgment Denials 
Based on Holdings of Law?
The Second Circuit in particular has expressed the concern that 
if post-trial, post-judgment review of summary judgment denials 
were available, district courts would be wary of denying summary 
judgments because they would fear wasting their resources by trying 
cases to judgments that might be overturned on the basis of 
erroneous denial of a summary judgment motion.263 I agree that this 
would be undesirable. I do not want courts to be wary of denying 
summary judgment; I believe that too many summary judgment 
motions are granted. The concern about wasting parties’ and judicial 
resources on unnecessary trials is understandable and especially 
valid in a time of crowded dockets, terribly expensive litigation, and 
inadequate allocation of resources to the federal judiciary. However, 
I am not proposing post-trial, post-judgment review of summary 
judgment denials that were based on district court findings of 
genuine issues of material fact. I am proposing post-judgment review 
of only those summary judgment denials that were grounded in 
errors of law. Although empirical data apparently does not exist to 
back-up my impression, I believe that denials based on errors of law 
are far out-numbered by denials based on genuine issues of material 
fact.264 Because district courts will recognize that most summary 
judgment denials are based on the presence of genuine issues of 
material fact, fear of possible appellate review will not make the 
263. See supra text accompanying note 63. Compare the concern expressed 
by the Fifth Circuit that post-trial, post-judgment review of summary judgment 
denials would undermine district courts’ discretion to deny summary judgment. 
Black v. J.I. Case Co., 22 F.3d 568, 572 (5th Cir. 1994). A related concern is that 
fear of the post-trial reversal of a denial of summary judgment would lead district 
courts to grant summary judgment motions, to allow an immediate post-final 
judgment appeal and prevent a potentially wasted trial, despite the courts’ discretion
not to do so “‘in a case where there is reason to believe that the better course would 
be to proceed to a full trial.’” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).
264. It seems likely that most summary judgment denials are based on the 
existence of genuine issues of material fact, since a genuine controversy about the 
operative facts is so common in cases that go to litigation. 
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courts wary of denying most summary judgment motions and 
proceeding to trial. Also, when alleged errors of law are at issue, 
federal trial judges can use 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to certify the 
questions of law for immediate appeal, if the judges truly are 
concerned about the correctness of their resolutions of those 
questions and if immediate appeal would materially advance the 
ultimate termination of the litigations.265 In that way, federal trial 
court judges can seek to avoid the investment in what might prove to 
be unnecessary trials. Finally, if a trial judge truly did make a 
prejudicial error of law in denying summary judgment, that 
circumstance warrants reversal, even if party and judicial resources 
were wasted as a result of the error.
V. A RECOMMENDED APPROACH
The current state of the law leaves litigants uncertain as to 
what, if anything, they must do to preserve for appeal issues that 
were raised in their summary judgment motions, and under what 
circumstances, if any, they may raise the denial of their motion for 
summary judgment on appeal after final judgment is issued. By the 
same token, uncertainty clouds the issues and arguments that 
prospective appellees may have to respond to—or seek to fight off as 
unreviewable—after final judgment. The uncertainty may affect a 
district court’s decision as to whether to embrace various ways by
which it might facilitate interlocutory appeals of issues raised by 
summary judgment motions that it denied266 and leaves federal courts 
of appeals struggling with the proper handling of post-judgment
appeals of summary judgment denials.
As the analysis in this Article indicates, I propose that, after 
final judgment, denials of summary judgment that were predicated 
on legal holdings (and not on the existence of genuine issues of 
material fact) be appealable as part of the appeal from the final 
judgment, assuming that mootness doctrines (having nothing to do 
with the mere fact of trial) have not made the issue moot. Rule 50 
motions are inapt and no other mechanism has gained acceptance as 
a vehicle for re-asserting the questions of law upon which summary 
judgment rulings may have rested. Indeed, it is questionable whether 
a litigant should need to make any additional motion or take any 
addition action to preserve for appeal an error in a denial of summary 
265. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2012).
266. See Jenike-Godshalk, supra note 29, at 1596. 
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judgment that was based upon a holding of law. In light of this 
background, before barring such appeals, the courts should make 
clear which actions or omissions in the trial court will warrant a 
holding that an appellant has waived or failed to preserve for appeal 
the erroneous denial of summary judgment that the appellant seeks to 
argue .
Permitting appeal of summary judgment denials after final 
judgment is issued will not add a substantial amount of work to the 
federal courts of appeals. Denials based on errors of law probably 
represent a small subset of summary judgment denials, and many 
within that subset will have been addressed on interlocutory appeals 
from summary judgment denials based on refusal to recognize 
qualified or absolute immunity. Moreover, by definition, appeals of 
summary judgment denials alleging errors of law address questions 
of law, rather than questions that require a time-consuming review of 
the trial record. Permitting such appeals without new prerequisites 
may even expedite litigation, both in the trial courts and on appeal, 
by rendering it unnecessary for parties to make additional motions to 
get an interlocutory appeal or to preserve an error for review.267
As previously noted, the Supreme Court has rejected the notion 
that providing different appellate treatment to summary judgment 
denials based on whether they are grounded in legal determinations 
or genuine issues of material fact is “unworkable.”268
Of course, it is a good idea for district court judges to clearly 
identify the grounds of their summary judgment denials, as they now 
must do.269 However, it is a bad idea to require appellate courts to 
“adopt a discrete list of the legal issues that, if presented in a motion 
for summary judgment, may be appealed following a full trial on the 
merits,” as one commentator proposed.270 The legal issues on which a 
motion for summary judgment may turn may not be anticipated, and 
there is no good reason why the reviewability of legal errors and 
267. See id. at 1613-14. If a party is unsure whether the denial of summary 
judgment he suffered will fall within the rule argued for in this Article, he still may 
take protective steps in the trial court. If he does, while that will reduce the potential 
savings, it will not increase protective steps relative to what parties already are 
doing. Cf. id. at 1614 (expressing concern about the legal-issue exception having the 
potential to increase the cost of litigation where it is uncertain whether a summary 
judgment denial was based on a pure legal issue).
268. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1995).
269. See Jenike-Godshalk, supra note 29, at 1627-28 (arguing for the clear 
disclosure by justices of the basis for their denials of summary judgment, although 
Rule 56 already has since been changed to achieve this). 
270. Id. at 1625.
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their appealability after final judgment should depend on whether a 
court or anyone else anticipated that a particular legal issue might 
arise. 
VI. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons argued above, this Article proposes that 
intermediate federal appeals courts should entertain post-trial, post-
judgment appeals from summary judgment denials based on legal 
determinations of issues that a party raised in the district court, that 
have not been mooted, that were not waived, and that are subsumed 
within or “merged” in the final judgment. There is no good reason 
why courts of appeals should not hear them. Indeed, the refusal to do 
so is highly aberrant and unjust in light of all the other pretrial 
rulings—including motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim on 
which relief can be granted, motions for judgment on the pleadings, 
and Rule 50 motions for judgment as a matter of law—that courts 
routinely entertain on appeal from final judgments. The post-
judgment appealability of summary judgment denials need remain a 
puzzle no longer.

